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I.  INTRODUCTION
In 1973, Sears Roebuck was sued by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission for discriminating against women by denying them positions in departments 
that paid commissions.1 Nearly thirty years later, Wal-Mart, which for many Americans 
had replaced Sears as the quintessential shopping destination, was sued for assigning 
women to limited dead-end jobs without promotional possibilities.2 In both cases, the 
companies defended the make-up of their workforce by claiming that the assignments 
were based on women’s own preferences and that women generally lacked interest in 
management positions.3 In the last decade, lawsuits nearly identical to that filed against 
     * Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.   An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at the 2003 Law and Society Conference held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and I am grateful for 
the comments I received at that time, as well as for the excellent research assistance of Stacy Garrick, Terra 
Nevitt and Emily Bradford.  
1 See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff’d, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 
1988).  Although the case was decided in the 1980s, it was originally filed in 1973.  See EEOC v. Sears, 
839 F.2d at 307.  A substantial critical literature developed around the Sears case, much of which focused 
on the court’s conclusion that women had “chosen” the non-commission paying jobs.  See, e.g., Vicki 
Schultz, Telling Stories About Women in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 1749, 1799-1839 (1990); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 813-45 
(1989).
2 See Reed Abelson, 6 Women Sue Wal-Mart, Charging Job and Promotion Bias, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 
2001, at C1.
3
  Compare  EEOC v. Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1305 (“Sears has proven, with many forms of evidence, 
that men and women tend to have different interests and aspirations regarding work, and that these 
differences explain in large part the lower percentage of women in commission sales jobs in general at 
Sears, especially in the particular divisions with the lowest proportion of women selling on commission.”) 
with Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart Faces Lawsuit Over Sex Discrimination, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, at 
A22 (noting that a Wal-Mart official “said women’s lack of interest in managerial jobs helped explain the 
lower percentage of women managers.”).
2Wal-Mart, and which challenge patterns like those at issue in the Sears case, have also 
been initiated against Home Depot and many of the major grocery chains around the 
country.4
 In 1974, the brokerage firm Merrill Lynch was sued for sex discrimination for 
refusing to hire women as brokers.5  The case settled shortly thereafter with a pledge by 
the firm to hire more women for its broker positions.6  A quarter of a century later, 
Merrill Lynch was again sued for failing to hire women as brokers, and consigning the 
women it did hire to positions, primarily as sales associates, that typically did not lead to 
management level jobs.7  As discussed in more detail below, similar lawsuits have been 
filed in the last decade against many of the largest brokerage firms in the country.8
These cases, and many others, offer an important challenge to the reigning 
consensus regarding the persistence of sex discrimination in the workplace.  Currently 
there is a widespread consensus, both in and outside of academia, that workplace 
discrimination against women has both receded and changed substantially over the last 
three decades.  Virtually all significant discussions regarding discrimination now treat 
discrimination as subtle, often unconscious in nature, and relatively free of animus or 
4
  These cases are discussed in section II.  I have previously written about the Home Depot case.  See
Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination 
Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 1249, 1281-89 (2003).
5 See Noelle Knox, Wall Street Battles Sexual Bias Even as Brokerage Industry Fights Discrimination, 
USA TODAY, Sept. 15, 2000, at 1B (discussing 1974 lawsuit).
6 Id.
7 See Stanley Ziemba, Merrill Lynch Hit With Bias Suit, CHI. TRIBUNE, Mar. 14, 1997, at B1.  The 
Merrill Lynch case is discussed further in section II, infra.  One thing that has changed is some of the 
methods.  In 1974, prospective stockbrokers were asked, “Which quality in a woman do you consider most 
important?”  The choices were beauty, intelligence, dependence, independence and affectionateness.  
Applicants were given two points for answering dependency or affectionateness, one point for beauty, and 
no points for intelligence or independence.  See Knox, supra note 5, at 1B.
8 The cases filed against stock brokerage firms are discussed in section II infra.
3what is often described as an intent to discriminate. 9  The workplace barriers women 
continue to experience are now more commonly attributed to their family commitments.10
A series of cases that have arisen over the last decade casts doubt on th is portrait 
of the workplace, and collectively suggest that discrimination remains a more powerful 
force in labor markets than is typically acknowledged.  These lawsuits have targeted 
particular, and often entire, industries – securities, retail, restaurants and automobile –
suggesting that these industries remain mired in sex stereotypes that see women as 
mothers who are marginal workers with their primary allegiance to be found outside of 
the labor market or as infiltrartors who are infringing on the privilege and status male 
workers have obtained.  Contrary to the emphasis on subtle discrimination, there is rarely 
anything subtle about the conduct in these cases; rather, all of the cases involve overt sex 
discrimination, and at least for these industries, provide substantial insight into the 
persistence of sex segregation and inequality for women.
By highlighting how these cases are inconsistent with the emphasis on subtle 
discrimination, I do not mean to suggest that the subtle discrimination hypothesis is 
wrong or even inaccurate; indeed, I have previously written about the importance and 
effect of subtle discrimination in the workplace and I firmly believe that much of the 
discrimination women face can be described as subtle, depending on how that term is 
9
   For discussions of the changing nature of sex discrimination and the ways in which such 
discrimination has become more subtle see VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
WOMEN (1998);  Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity, 
85 MINN. L. REV. 587, 603-17 (2000); Barbara Reskin, Imagining Work Without Exclusionary Barriers, 14 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 313, 318-23 (2002); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: 
A Structural Approach, 101 COLUMBIA L. REV.  458, 469-89 (2001).   
10
   For a sampling of the extensive literature see ANITA ILTA GARVEY, WEAVING WORK AND 
MOTHERHOOD (1999); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER (2000).
4used.11  Rather, what I mean to suggest is that there remains a significant amount of 
discrimination in the workplace that cannot accurately be described as subtle but which 
involves the active and conscious exclusion of women from the workplace, and that we 
must remain focused on the entrenched nature of institutional sex discrimination if we are 
to make further progress toward greater equality both in and outside of the workplace.       
Although the class action cases are generally inconsistent with an emphasis on 
subtle discrimination, they are consistent with a theory of sexual harassment that has 
recently been developed by Professors Kathryn Abrams and Vicki Schultz.12  Under the 
theories developed by these scholars, sexual harassment is less about sexual desire or 
dominance and more about preserving male norms within the workplace.  As will be 
discussed in more detail shortly, this theory helps explain the underlying basis for these 
class action cases, even for those cases that do not involve formal claims of sexual 
harassment but are instead presented as classic cases of disparate treatment 
discrimination.  Even in the twenty-first century, many male workers, particularly in 
certain industries that have traditionally been dominated by men, act in ways that are 
intended to preserve their places by excluding or marginalizing women.  
This article will be divided in two distinct sections.  In section II, I will discuss 
the set of cases that have arisen over the last decade in three areas:  (1) securities 
industry; (2) grocery industry and (3) class action sexual harassment cases.  In section III, 
11
   For some of my contributions on the subject see Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, 
Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1284-89 (1995) (discussing 
relationship between subtle discrimination and affirmative action); Michael Selmi, Response to Professor 
Wax: Discrimination as Accident, Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233 (1999) (exploring meaning of 
subtle discrimination in the context of Professor Wax’s argument).  More recently I have cautioned against 
expansive definitions of subtle discrimination. See  Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of 
Perspective Rather than Intent, 34 COL. HUMAN RTS. L. RVW. 657 (2003) . 
12 See Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 
(1998); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998). 
5I will then offer some analysis of what these cases can tell us about the nature and 
persistence of discrimination, and in section IV I will add some reflections on what these 
cases mean for the way in which we think about sex discrimination in the future.  I should 
also add that this article is primarily intended as what I call a “reminder” paper, with the 
reminder here being that intentional and overt discrimination remains a vital part of the 
labor market.  
II.  THE CLASS ACTION SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES.
During the last decade there has been a sharp rise in prominent class action cases 
alleging widespread patterns of discrimination.13  Many of the most prominent cases, 
including those filed against Texaco and Coca-Cola, have involved allegations of race 
discrimination,14 but there have also been a slew of cases challenging patterns of sex 
discrimination within a variety of industries.  The first major case, which arose in the 
1980s, involved a challenge to the job assignments of the State Farm Insurance agency, 
which had traditionally failed to hire women for positions as insurance agents.  That case 
settled for more than $150 million, and remains the largest settlement in a sex 
discrimination case against a private party.15  Perhaps prompted by the success of the 
State Farm case, similar cases have been filed challenging discriminatory assignment
practices in the securities and grocery industries.16  At about the same time, a series of 
13 See Selmi, supra note 4, at 1249 (discussing the rise in class action litigation).  
14 See Henry Unger, Coke to Settle Racial Suit with $192.5 Million Deal, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 17, 
2000, at A1 (discussing Coca-Cola suit); Alison Frankel, Tale of the Tapes, AM. LAW., Mar. 1997, at 64 
(providing a detailed analysis of the Texaco litigation).  I discuss the Texaco litigation in Selmi, supra note 
4, at 1268-80. 
15 See Philip Hager, State Farm to Pay Women $157 Million for Job Bias, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1992, at 
A1.  The largest sex discrimination settlement, indeed the largest discrimination settlement of any kind, 
involved the settlement of a lawsuit against the United States Information Agency after nearly twenty-five 
years of litigation.  See Bill Miller and David A. Vise, U.S. Settles Job Bias Case: A Record $508 Million is 
Due Women in USIA Dispute, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2000, at A1.   
16
  Many of the grocery store cases were filed by the firm that handled the State Farm case.  See Russell 
Mitchell, The SWAT Team of Bias Litigation, BUS. WK., Jan. 23, 1995, at 88.  One of the original partners 
6class action sexual harassment cases have arisen that, as I will discuss in more detail 
shortly, are closely related to the exclusionary practices that have been challenged in the 
assignment cases.  In this section, I will describe and detail the rise of class action 
litigation in the securities and grocery industries, as well as the sexual harassment class 
action cases.       
1.  The Securities Industry.
The securities industry has long been identified as an aggressive male-dominated 
industry, and indeed, the popular image is not far from the mark.  On the trading floor 
and in Wall Street offices, macho behavior, including crude language and boorish 
conduct, is often the norm.17  At the same time, the industry is not just a place to move 
money but it is also a place where money can be made in droves, and women have long 
been seeking their place in the industry.  Over the last decade, women have gradually 
infiltrated the securities industry, though they remain a substantial minority in all but the 
least desirable clerical positions.  As of 1996, approximately 15% of the more than 
100,000 brokers nationwide were women, and women held fewer than 8% of the 
positions at the level of Vice President or above.18  This modest infiltration of women, 
however, has not transformed the workplace, which remains deeply male and often 
deeply abusive.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, female brokers have initiated a slew of lawsuits 
alleging various forms of discrimination, including the failure to promote women, the 
in the law firm is also involved in the case against Wal-Mart, which is being handled by a consortium of 
attorneys.   
17
   There is an extensive literature chronicling the behavior that prevails on Wall Street.  See, e.g., 
FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O: THE INSIDE STORY OF A WALL STREET TRADER (1998).  For an earlier 
version detailing the world of investment banking see MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER (1989).     
18 See Michael Siconolfi & Margaret A. Jacobs, Wall Street Fails to Stem Rising Claims of Sex 
Harassment and Discrimination, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1996, at C1. 
7failure to train or mentor women, pervasive sexual harassment, including quid pro quo 
harassment where male bosses were seeking sexual favors for employment prerequisites.  
Few of the major firms have been able to escape the allegations, and more lawsuits are 
likely forthcoming.19  What is equally clear, although all but one of the cases has settled, 
the allegations all appear to have been substantiated at least to some significant degree.  
Indeed, most of the firms did not deny the substance of the allegations; rather, their 
defenses, to the extent defenses were mounted, contended that the practices were not as 
pervasive as alleged.20
Likely the best known of the cases was also the first to be filed against the firm 
that was then known as Smith, Barney, an old line firm that has since become part of the 
conglomerate Travelers, Inc.  Initially filed in 1996, the case alleged that the company 
systematically discriminated against women in hiring, assignments, pay and promotions, 
as well as through pervasive sexual harassment.21 According to the allegations, only five 
percent of Smith Barney’s brokers were women, and less than two percent of its branch 
managers were women.  The company, on the other hand, claimed that women accounted 
for 13% of its brokers, and just over 2% of its branch managers.22  The lead plaintiff in 
the case, Pamela Martens, was a 50-year old women who had worked at the firm for ten 
years and who managed $187 million for the company, but who was fired two days after 
19
  The cases are listed in Table One. 
20
  As discussed below, most of the cases have settled without substantial litigation.  Currently, a case 
filed against Morgan Stanley is being litigated, and that case may produce more detailed judicial 
determinations.  As a result, most of the case descriptions are provided based on journalistic accounts, 
motions filed in the cases, and stories told by parties, rather than from published opinions.    
21 See Saundra Tory & Jay Matthews, Three Women Sue Smith Barney: Former, Current Employees 
Accuse Brokerage of Discrimination,WASH. POST, May 21, 1996, at D3.
22 Id.; see also Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
8she complained about discriminatory behavior in her New Jersey office and retained an 
attorney to pursue her complaints.23
More women joined the lawsuit shortly after it was filed and the case was 
eventually certified as a class action consisting of more than 20,000 past and former 
employees.  Many of the allegations have now become commomplace in the securities 
cases.  In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that they were systematically excluded from 
lucrative broker jobs and instead channeled into low-paying positions as sales 
assistants.24  Those women who became brokers were typically denied the most 
important accounts, received little to no mentoring, and were subjected to gross and 
extensive harassment.25  The case became best known for what was described as a “boom 
boom” room -- a room that was located in the basement of the Garden City, New York 
office where male brokers would go at the end of the day to drink from a garbage can and 
from which women were excluded.26  At that same office, women were ordered to wear 
short skirts and strippers were a frequent accompaniment for the male brokers and some 
of their clients,27 and one of the managers wore a gun strapped to his ankle while the 
branch manager occasionally brandished his own gun in the office.28
 As a legal matter, the case also became important as a challenge to the mandatory 
arbitration proceedings that had been instituted by the brokerage houses for all of their 
23 The case has been chronicled in a book by SUSAN ANTILLA, TALES FROM THE BOOM, BOOM ROOM: 
WOMEN VS. WALL STREET (2002).
24 See Kristen Downey Grimsley, 26 Women Sue Smith Barney, Allege Bias, WASH. POST., Nov. 6, 
1996, at C11.
25 See, e.g., Leah Spiro, Smith Barney’s Woman Problem, BUS. WK., June 3, 1996, at 102.
26 ANTILLA, supra note 23, at 59-60.
27 See Women Claimed Smith Barney Treated Them the Old Fashioned Way, 7 WORLD ARB. & 
MEDIATION REP. 147 (1996).
28 ANTILLA, supra note 23, at 62.
9employees.29  The class action allegations were seen as a way around the arbitration 
proceedings, and ultimately the case was settled in a manner that allowed members of the 
plaintiff class to avoid the mandatory proceedings in favor of a more neutral arbitration 
forum.30  Under the settlement, more than 1900 women filed complaints, the vast 
majority of whom were former employees.31  Most of the claims were successfully settled 
for amounts that were not disclosed.  However, under the arbitration system established 
pursuant to the settlement, one broker recently received an award of $3.2 million, 
including $1.5 million in punitive damages as a penalty for the company’s tolerance of 
pervasive sexual harassment.32  In addition to the individual relief, the settlement required 
Smith Barney to spend $15 million toward various diversity initiatives, including 
training.33
29
   In the last decade, there has been a tremendous amount of litigation involving clauses that require 
employees to arbitrate claims against their employer, and these causes initially gained their popularity in 
the brokerage industry as an adjunct to arbitration clauses that clients signed to adjudicate claims against 
their brokers.  See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (permitting arbitration of 
age discrimination claim as part of a securities employment agreement); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999).  For a sampling of the literature see Kenneth R. Davis, 
The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability in the Securities Industry, 78 B.U. L. REV. 255 (1998); Samuel 
Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 NYU L. REV. 1344 
(1997); Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 
S.CT. ECON. REV. 209 (2000); Dennis Nolan, Labor and Employment Arbitration: What’s Justice Got to 
Do With It? 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 40 (1998); Kahterine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of 
Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996).    
30 See Martens v. Smith Barney, 1998 WL 1661385 (SDNY 1998) (final order and Judgment 
Approving Class Action Settlement and Dismissing Claims).  In response to the legal developments, 
including the Smith Barney case, a number of other firms have adjusted their arbitration policies to make 
them more flexible.  See Patrick McGeehan, PaineWebber to Permit Suits on Harassment, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 4, 1998, at C1. 
31 See Debra Baker, Tangled Up in Ticker Tape, ABA JOURNAL, Dec. 1999, at 44.  Thirteen hundred of 
the claimants settled without going through the arbitration process.  See Gary Weiss, A Settlement That’s 
Not Settled, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 30, 2000, at 164.  Another 38 members opted out of the settlement, 
including the lead plaintiff and a collateral proceeding began that was designed to challenge the terms of 
the agreement.  See Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2001). 
32 See Randall Smith, Salomon is Told to Pay Broker $3.2 Million, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2002, at C1.
In contrast, the first woman to go through the arbitration system lost her claim and obtained no relief.  See
Robert Trigaux, Up Against the Wall, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 24, 2003, at 1E. 
33 See Patrick McGeehan, Judge Approves Class-Action Settlement for Sex Harassment at Smith Barney, 
WALL ST. J., July 27, 1998, at A4 (discussing settlement terms).
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One year after the Smith Barney case was filed, a similar class action claim was 
initiated against Merrill Lynch, which at the time of the lawsuit was the nation’s largest 
brokerage firm with more than 13,000 brokers.34  As noted earlier, Merrill Lynch had 
actually been sued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for discrimination 
against women twenty years earlier.35  The 1974 case was settled with a pledge by Merrill 
Lynch to hire more women for a five-year period, but the company never met the targets 
that were established as part of that settlement and no one ever seemed to notice.36  By 
the time the suit was filed in 1996, 5.8% of Merrill Lynch’s brokers were women, about
the same percentage that had existed in 1990.37
Although the salacious harassment claims that had been a central part of the 
Smith Barney case were absent in the action against Merrill Lynch, the substance of the 
underlying claims was nearly identical.  The class action alleged that women were 
systematically discriminated against in pay and promotions largely by the subjective way 
in which business was channeled to male brokers.38  As was true of Smith Barney, and 
the other cases that were filed, the women also contended that they had been excluded 
from golf and strip club outings with clients, and that the company typically viewed its 
female employees as secondary earners.39 For example, one of the lead plaintiffs, an 
experienced broker with an MBA, was asked during her interview how much money her 
34 See Ann Wozencraft, Bias at the Bull: Merrill Lynch’s Class Action Settlement Draws a Crowd, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1999, at C1.
35 See note 5 supra.
36 See Noelle Knox, Wall Street Battles Sexual Bias Even as Brokerage Industry Fights Discrimination, 
USA TODAY, Sept. 15, 2000, at 1B (noting that Merrill Lynch had agreed to a goal of having women 
constitute 16% of all new hires annually but that “[t]wenty years later, Merrill Lynch had not yet reached 
the target”). 
37 See Ann Wozencraft, Bias at the Bull: Merrill Lynch’s Class Action Settlement Draws a Crowd, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1999, at C1.
38 Id. (“Among [the plaintiffs’] chief concerns are how accounts from departing workers, walk-ins, leads 
and referrals are distributed.”).  See also Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. 
Supp. 1460, 1464 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
39 See Susan E. Reed, Taking the Bull By the Horns, AMER. PROSPECT, Aug. 14, 2000, at 34-35.  
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husband made.40  At a firm meeting of more than 100 female brokers, it was discovered 
that none of the women present had been chosen to participate in a new program aimed at 
generating new investor accounts.41  The lead plaintiff in the case, Marybeth Cremin, 
alleged that her supervisor made disparaging remarks about her status as a working 
mother, and told her that she would be more successful if she divorced her husband.42
When Cremin returned to work after a maternity leave, she was ordered to surrender all 
of her accounts and she was promptly fired.43
One year after the case was filed, the parties settled on terms that were much like 
those adopted in the Smith Barney case, with the important exception that Merrill Lynch 
did not commit any funds to diversity efforts.44  Of the 22,000 member class, it was 
determined that 2,700 individuals were eligible to file claims, and more than 900 (one of 
three) ultimately did.45  The company settled most of the claims for amounts that 
reportedly ranged from $20,000 to $40,000.46
40 Id. at 35.
41 See Wozencraft, supra note –, at C1.
42
  Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, 957 F. Supp. at 1464.
43 Id.
44 See Patrick McGeehan, Merrill Lynch Settles Sex-Bias Lawsuit Creating a System to Resolve 
Complaints, N.Y. TIMES., May 5, 1998, at C25.
45 See Robert Manor, Sex Bias Case Could Cost Broker Millions, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Mar. 2, 1999, at 
39. 
46 See Merrill Lynch Offers to Settle With Women in Gender-Bias Cases, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2000, at 
C16.
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Table One
Securities Class Action Defendants
1993-2002
As indicated in Table One, other cases with similar allegations abound.  
Following on the heels of the Merrill Lynch settlement, two cases were filed against 
American Express and Morgan Stanley.  The American Express case, which also 
included allegations of age discrimination, alleged systemic discrimination against 
women who applied for or attained the position of financial advisor.47  Like the other 
cases, the plaintiffs also alleged discrimination in assignments, training and mentoring as 
a result of sex stereotyping, namely that women were not as aggressive as men.48  The 
case settled for $31 million and a series of proposed reforms, including new means of 
distributing accounts to its employees.49 In contrast, rather than settling its case, Morgan 
Stanley is currently embroiled in class action litigation with private plaintiffs assisted by 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which has also filed a claim for sex 
discrimination against the company.50  One of the lead plaintiffs in the Morgan Stanley 
47 See Kosen v. American Express Financial Advisors, Civil Action No. 01:02CV0082 (D.D.C. 2001), ¶
1.
48 Id. at  ¶ 30.
49 See David Phelps, Judge Approves Amex Settlement in Sex, Age-Discrimination Lawsuit, Star 
Tribune, June 18, 2002, at 3D; Jerry Markon & Jill Carroll, Financial Firm Agrees to Settle Bias Lawsuit, 
Feb. 21, 2002, WALL ST. J., at A3.  
50 See Charles Gasparino & Gaston F. Ceron, EEOC Joins Wall Street Sex-Bias Suit, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
11, 2001, at C1.
American Express Financial
Gruntal Corp.
Lew Lieberman
Merrill Lynch
Morgan Stanley
Olde Discount
Smith Barney
US Bancorp Piper Jaffrey
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case was a high-ranking woman with an annual salary that exceeded $1 million a year 
and who was fired shortly after she complained about not being promoted to a managing 
partner position.51 Similar cases or claims of system-wide discrimination have also been 
filed against Olde Securities, US Bancorp, Lew Lieberman and Gruntal Co., and large 
individual cases that have the potential to expand to class actions have been filed against 
ING Barings, JP Morgan, and Kidder Peabody, the latter of which involved claims 
originally filed in 1993.52
Although it is always difficult to draw definitive conclusions from settled cases, it 
is not too much to suggest that these cases, in both their volume and size, describe an 
industry that remains resistant to change and hostile to women. Equally clear, the 
lawsuits do not appear to have brought fundamental change.  In 2001, only 15% of the 
brokers were women  and women held 12.2% of the branch manager positions.53  At 
Merrill Lynch, despite its recent lawsuit, women’s representation among brokers has 
increased from 15 to 16%, or just one percent higher than the original goal from its 1974 
lawsuit.54
2.  The Grocery Industry.
The grocery industry employs more than three million individuals, and remains 
one of the few large industries where employees can earn decent wages with substantial 
51 See Patrick McGeehan, Wall Street Highflier to Outcast: A Woman’s Story, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 
10, 2002, at C1.
52 See Kate Kelly, Floor Gover at Big Board Claims Sex Bias at ING Barings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 
2001, at C1; Patrick McGeehan, Duo Pursues Sex-Bias Cases on Wall Street, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1997, 
at C1 (Olde Discount); Leon Nathans Spiro, The Angry Voices at Kidder, BUS. WK., Feb. 1, 1993, at 60; 
Benjamin Weiner, Three Women Accuse Investment Concern of Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, April 29, 
1997, at B4 (Lex Lieberman); Former Employee Files Lawsuit Charging J.P. Morgan Securities with Bias, 
N.Y. TIMES, April 11, 2001, at C13; Thomas J. Mulligan, EEOC Sues Brokerage in Gender Bias Cases, 
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2001, at C1 (noting case was seeking class action status). 
53 See Securities Industry Association, Report on Diversity Strategy, Development and Demographics 
12 (2001).  
54 See Reed, supra note 39, at 36 (“In 1996, when Cremin began her lawsuit, only 15% of the financial 
consultants at the firm were female . . . Today only 16 percent are female.”) 
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promotional possibilities without possessing a college degree. 55  Promotions to managers 
have traditionally arisen internally, rather than from an external labor market, and 
historically both the meat and produce departments have been the most desirable 
positions because they are the most profitable departments and offer the greatest 
promotional opportunities.  More recently, grocery stores have expanded their offerings 
and many now offer bakeries and delicatessans, although these departments, largely 
because they are new, are not typically part of the ladder to management.  Not 
surprisingly, men dominate the meat and produce departments, while women tend to be 
concentrated in the bakery and delicatessen departments.
   Publix is Florida’s largest grocery store chain, and the largest privately owned 
supermarket chain in the United States with sales of more than $10 billion in 1996.56  The 
store has long been admired for its operations, and has consistently been included on lists 
of  the “best places to work” in America and it is equally well known for its high 
customer service.57  Publix, however, also has a history of hostility toward women, 
particularly in its management practices.  In 1978, Publix printed and distributed 
brochures opposing the Equal Rights Amendment, and as late as 1994, its evaluation 
form for managers asked, “Family Status (does wife work?).”58
55
  The data with respect to the grocery industry can be found at 
www.bls.gov/oes/2001/oes13_541.htmp.boo.oooo (last visited July 17, 2003).  For a discussion of the 
promotional process see Stuart Silverstein, In Supermarkets’ Executive Department, A Lack of Variety 
Labor , L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1999, at C1 (noting that “supermarket executive and upper-management jobs 
don’t require the MBAs or other prestigious degrees that are important for career advancement elsewhere . . 
. “). 
56 See Kristen Downey Grimsley, Fla. Grocery Chain Settles Sex Bias Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 
1997, at D1 (“The company, which is privately held and owned by its employees, had sales of more than 
$10 billion in 1996.”).  
57 See Scott Thurston, Book Lists Delta Among Ten Best Places to Work, ATLANTA J. CONSTITUTION, 
Jan. 23, 1993, at D1; Erica Beshears, Survey Ranks Publix No. 1, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 22, 1997, at 
1E; Kim Norris, Publix Ranking Slides in Most Admired List, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 15, 1997, at 1E.
58 See Ann Hull, A Woman’s Place, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 2, 1997, at 1A.
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In 1992, the EEOC began investigating charges of gender and race discrimination 
at Publix stores, and three years later eight women filed suit against the grocery chain 
alleging that Publix discriminated against them on the basis of their sex. 59  The plaintiffs, 
represented by the premier employment discrimination firm Saperstein, Goldstein, 
Demchak and Baller and by two Tallahassee lawyers, obtained class certification for their 
suit in March of 1996, with the class consisting of more than 100,000 female
management and non-management employees at Publix who had worked for the 
company since 1991.60 The primary class allegation was that Publix had engaged in sex 
stereotyping by systematically channeling women into low-wage, dead-end jobs that 
would not lead to the higher paying, male-dominated management positions.61  The 
women claimed that they were kept in cashier and deli positions while men were placed 
in management-track stock and clerk positions.62  To build their case, the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers relied primarily on statistical evidence – statistics that were compiled by 
representatives of the plaintiffs who walked into stores to observe the photographs Publix 
posted of its managers.  The portraits provided a compelling picture of sex 
discrimination.   A union representative who took part in the store visits explained, “My 
God, you’d go in the stores and you didn’t need a clipboard to write down what you saw.  
It was all white guys on those pictures.”63
Ultimately, the plaintiffs compiled an impressive statistical case.  Relying on 
EEOC and Census Bureau statistics, the plaintiffs’ lawyers claimed that although women 
59 Id.  In November, the EEOC sought permission to join the action, and by December, the number of 
named plaintiffs had increased to twelve.  Id.
60
 1996 U.S. Dist., LEXIS 3381 at *31, *32.   The states were Florida, Georgia, South Carolina and 
Alabama. 
61
   Nicole Harris, Revolt at the Deli Counter, BUSINESS WEEK, April 1, 1996, at 32
62 Id.
63
   Hull, supra note 58, at 1A.
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held forty percent of all supermarket management positions nationwide, women 
accounted for only twenty-one percent of Publix’s management positions.64  Moreover, 
the women who did make it into management for Publix tended to manage the 
delicatessen department, a position that was 90% female and was, not coincidentally, 
among the lowest paying of management positions, and one that traditionally did not lead 
to more substantial management positions.65  Publix also required its store managers to 
have experience working as a stock person, and its meat managers to have worked as 
meat cutters, positions women had long been discouraged from seeking.66   In 1994, only 
3 of the 456 (0.6%) meat department managers were women, with 11 (2.4%) female 
produce managers; in contrast, 390 of the 433 (90%) deli managers were women.67 This 
allegation followed a pattern established in other grocery store litigation where it was 
determined that women managers were concentrated in newer departments such as the 
bakery and delicatessen, whereas men dominated the traditional departments of meat and 
produce from which most promotions were made.68 Plaintiffs also maintained that, as a 
result of sex stereotyping, full-time male employees earned on average 35% more than 
full-time female employees.69
According to the plaintiffs, one primary reason for the segregated workforce was 
that the decision making process regarding promotions and entry-level placement was 
64 Id.
65 See id. (chart detailing management positions, percent female, and maximum weekly pay.  Store 
managers, 2% of whom are women, make a maximum weekly salary of $820.  Deli managers, 90% of 
whom are women, make a maximum weekly salary of $600).
66 See Shores v. Publix Markets, 1996 WL 407850 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 1996).
67
   Hull, supra note 58, at 1A.
68
   As discussed in more detail shortly, there have been a large number of similar cases, though the only 
case with a published decision on liability remains the case against Lucky’s Stores.  See Stender v. Lucky 
Stores, 803 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
69 Id.
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largely subjective.70  Job openings were not posted at Publix, rather managers 
subjectively determined who should apply for upper-level positions and passed the 
information along by what was described as a “tap on the shoulder” system.71  Managers 
were not provided with any written guidelines on promotions or initial placements but 
instead had total discretion to steer new workers into gender stereotyped positions.  It was 
also alleged that managers exercised their discretion regarding who received what 
training in a similarly discriminatory manner.  
Publix did not dispute the statistics but instead sought to explain the disparities as 
a product of  women’s preferences.   The company maintained that the discrepancy in 
hiring and promotion was due to the fact that male applicants were more likely to have 
prior experience in stock and clerk positions and that women chose dead-end jobs 
because those jobs often had better hours and did not require relocating.72  Company 
officials made similar statements during the course of the litigation seeking to link the 
store assignments to women’s interests in balancing their family and work 
commitments.73
After a lengthy mediation, Publix settled the case in early 1997 for $81.5 million 
dollars, one of the largest settlements of its kind.74  The settlement also included a series 
of planned changes in their employment practices, including creating minimum 
70
 1996 U.S. Dist., LEXIS 3381 at *15, *16.
71 Id.
72
 Harris, supra note 61, at 32.
73 See Gregg Fields, Publix Settles Discrimination Case, MIAMI HERALD, May 30, 2001, at D1 (noting 
that the company had attributed differences in number of managers to “career choices that women 
themselves made, such as reducing hours after they had children.”); Kimberly Blanton, In the Publix Eye: 
$81.5 Million Settlement is a Showcase for EEOC’s Activism in High-Profile Class Action Suits, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 16, 1997, at E1 (noting that company official had testified that “many female associates do not 
have an active interest in stocking shelves”).  
74 See Allen R. Myerson, Supermarket Chain To Pay $81 Million To Settle a Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 25, 1997, at A1.
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requirements for store-level jobs, and establishing a job candidate pool so that those 
interested in pursuing other positions could do so.75   The company also agreed to fill 
store jobs with a number of women proportionate to those who apply, agreed to provide 
employees with new employment training and job advancement programs, but did not 
agree to post job openings.76  One of the interesting sidenotes from the case is that the 
firm never seemed to suffer a loss of business from the lawsuit even though women 
constituted a majority of its shoppers.77
Although the Publix case was the most recent of the large class action cases, it 
was typical of a series of lawsuits that have been filed against grocery chains around the 
country during the last decade.  The largest of the cases, and the only one to have a 
published decision on liability,78 involved a suit filed against the Western chain known as 
Lucky’s, now owned by American Stores, which ultimately settled in the early 1990s for 
$107 million.79  A New York Times story summarized the allegations in the case in this 
way:  “The women said they were channeled into dead-end jobs, either working the cash 
registers or in relatively new departments like bakeries and delicatessens, rather than in 
the main grocery and produce sections at the core of most supermarket operations, where 
75 Id.
76 See Lisa Blackman, PublixPays Women $81 million, THE TAMPA TRIBUNE, Jan. 25, 1997, at 1.  In 
2000, a group of 10 women sought and were denied class certification for a new class action against Publix 
representing women who work in Publix food production plants and distribution centers.  See Dyer v. 
Publix Super Markets, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4455 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2000).  The plaintiffs alleged 
that women were channeled into fruit and vegetable processing jobs, which were dead-end jobs, and 
discouraged from warehouse jobs and higher-paying mechanic, fork-lift operator and truck driver positions.  
Id. at 9-10.  
77 See Michael Sasso, Discrimination Lawsuits Haven’t Deterred Shoppers, THE LEDGER, Jan. 21, 
2001, at E1 (“[I]n the three months following the settlement . . . Publix’s sales were actually up about 9 
percent from the same three months in 1996.  Meanwhile, profits were up 22 percent over the same quarter 
in 1996.”). 
78 See Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
79 See Benjamin A. Holden, American Stores to Settle Sex-Bias Suit By Paying As Much as $107.3 
Million, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 19993, at A2.
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jobs are generally better paid and can lead to promotions.”80 Like Publix, the case 
against Lucky’s was replete with comments from management regarding women’s lack 
of “drive,” their unwillingness to work long hours because of the child responsibilities 
and fears that the public might react negatively to women in management positions.81  In 
addition to the lawsuit against Lucky’s, similar lawsuits were filed against Safeway, 
Albertson’s and  Save Mart, all of which were premised on similar assignment patterns 
and all of which settled relatively quickly.82
The case against Lucky’s, and several other West Coast chains, began in the mid-
1980s with suits originally initiated by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission.83  The allegations and defenses in those cases were identical to those made 
in the more recent cases.  Upon the filing of the first lawsuits, one of the initial 
defendants stated that promotional opportunities required transferring from store to store, 
and women were not interested in relocating, the very same defense used in the Publix 
80 See Jane Gross, Big Grocery Chain Reaches Landmark Sex-Bias Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1993, 
at A1.
81
  Stender, 803 F. Supp. at 332.  For a comprehensive discussion of the Lucky’s case see Kara Swisher, 
At the Checkout Counter, Winning Women’s Rights, WASH. POST, June 12, 1994, at H1.  For a discussion 
of the case and the Stender decision see Eric J. Wallach and Heidi Lichthardt, Lucky Stores Has Lessons for 
Employers, NATIONAL LAW J., Feb. 28, 1994, at S17.
82 See Margaret A. Jacobs, Albertson’s Settles Bias Suit, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1993, at B12 (suit filed 
in 1992 settled for $29.5 million); Arthur M. Louis, Safeway Settles Sex Discrimination Suit, S.F. 
CHRONICLE, April 2, 1994, at D1 (suit originally filed in 1991 settled for $7.5 million); Arthur M. Louis, 
Sex Bias Settles Roils Industry:  Changes in National Supermarket Personnel Practices Expected, S.F. 
CHRONICLE, Dec. 18, 1993, at D1 (noting that suit against Save Mart had settled for $6.5 million). 
83
  A set of lawsuits against four Washington state chains was filed in 1986.  See Hal Taylor and Cathy 
Cohn, Four Chains Sued for Sex Bias, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Aug. 25, 1986, at 18 (noting that the EEOC 
had filed class action suits against Albertson’s, Fred Meyer, Safeway and Thrifty Stores).  One of the 
charges that formed the basis for the Lucky’s case was filed in 1985.  See Barbara Presley Noble, Battling 
Sex Bias in a Store Chain, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1992, at C27.  Although the allegations were slightly 
different, a lawsuit was filed in the 1970s alleging sex discrimination in promotions against the Dallas area 
Piggly Wiggly stores.  See Carter v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1150 (N.D. Tex. 1979). 
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case.84  Women were also said to have  “chosen” checker positions because of their 
“flexibility.”85
Table Two
Grocery Store ClassAction Defendants
1990-2002
Despite the bevy of lawsuits, it is equally clear that the pattern of discrimination 
within the grocery industry remains today, some twenty years after the initial suits were 
filed.  In the late 1990s, cases alleging sex discrimination along the same lines as those 
discussed above were filed against a Midwestern chain, Kohl’s Markets, and a North 
Carolina-based chain, Ingles markets.86  Like Publix, the Ingles case was premised on the 
“visual inspection” technique of reviewing photographs of the managers posted in the 
stores, which demonstrated that men occupied all of the management positions in the 39 
stores that were surveyed.87  Dominick’s markets based in Chicago was sued in 1995 and 
subsequently settled their case for more than $7 million, and in 1999, the Florida chain 
84 See Taylor and Cohn, supra note 83, at 18
85 Id.
86 See Tom Daykin, Suit Against Kohl’s Now Class Action, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Mar. 19, 
1999, at B3 (“The suit alleges Kohl’s segregates bakery and produce jobs by sex, reserving the higher-
paying produce jobs for male employees.”); Christine Blank, Ingles Hit By Class-Action Sex-Bias Suit, 
SUPERMARKET NEWS, Mar. 9, 1998, at 4 (“The suit . . . allege[s] that women were relegated to cashier, 
clerk , deli and baker positions, and are seldom promoted to management.”). 
87 See Blank, supra note 86, at 4 (“A visual survey of management pictures in 39 Ingles’ stores showed 
that 100% of the manager, assistant manager and produce, meat and grocery manager positions were held 
by men, the plaintiffs’ lawyers said.”).  Ingles quickly settled the case for $14 million.  See Stuart 
Silverstein, In Supermarkets’ Executive Department, A Lack of Variety, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1999, at C1. 
Albertson’s
Dominic’s
Ingles Markets
Kash-n-Karry
Kohl’s
Lucky Stores
Publix 
Safeway
Save Mart
Winn Dixie
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Winn-Dixie settled a race and sex discrimination claim for $33 million the raised similar 
claims.88
In addition to the grocery store cases, several other large retailers have been 
targeted for similar discriminatory practices.  In 1996, Home Depot was hit with two 
class action cases that alleged that women were systematically assigned to cashier 
positions rather than working on the sales floor from which promotions were typically 
made.89  Several years later, and on the eve of trial, Home Depot settled the cases for 
more than $100 million.90  More recently, Wal-Mart was the subject of what is likely to 
be the largest class action case of its kind when it was sued by a consortium of attorneys 
for sex-segregated assignments and promotions.91  The suit against Wal-Mart, the 
nation’s largest retailer, and largest private employer in the country, alleges that Wal-
Mart relies on sex-stereotyping for its assignments and promotions, largely due to its 
failure to post job openings and instead relying on subjective employment practices by its 
male-dominated management.92
3.  Sexual Harassment Class Actions.    
Many of the securities and grocery store cases included allegations of sexual 
harassment; the Smith Barney case, in particular, gained much of its notoriety for its 
88
  Robert Berner, Winn-Dixie Settles A Bias Lawsuit for $33 Million, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1999, at B2.  
Another Florida grocery chain, Kash n’Karry, has recently been the subject of a pay discrimination lawsuit 
by its female employees.  See William R. Levesque, Female Workers Sue Plant City, Fla., Grocery Chain, 
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 6, 2001, at C2.
89 See Selmi, supra note 4, at 1281-87 (discussing Home Depot lawsuit and its aftermath).
90 Id. at 1285.
91 See Bob Egelko, Sex Discrimination Cited at Wal-Mart: Lawyers Seek OK for Class-Action Suit, S.F.
CHRONICLE, April 29, 2003, at B1.
92 See Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. c-01-2252 MJJ (N.D. 
Cal. 2002) (on-file with author).  Although Wal-Mart;s sales staff is 72% female, only one-third of its 
female sales staff reaches management positions, a level that matches its peers twenty-five years ago.  See 
Michelle Coulin & Wendy Zellner, Is Wal-Mart Hostile to Women? BUS. WK., July 16, 2001, at 58.  
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infamous boom boom room and other allegations of harassment of female employees.93
But the last decade has also seen the rise of class action sexual harassment cases, a cause 
of action that had previously not been recognized and one that remains controversial.94
The best known of these cases involved the claims filed against the Japanese 
automobile manufacturer, Mitsubishi, stemming from the practices at its plant in the 
ironically named Normal, Illinois.  The initial suit, filed on behalf of 29 women in 1994, 
alleged a pattern of harassment that included sexual abuse, lewd remarks and other forms 
of discrimination.95  As many as 400 male employees at the 3800 worker plant were 
accused of taking part in the harassment.  Several years later, the EEOC filed its first ever 
class action sexual harassment suit contending that as many as 400 of the 940 women 
who had worked at the plant had been subjected to a hostile working environment.96
When built in the 1980s, the Mitsubishi plant offered a rare opportunity for high-
paying jobs in what was an otherwise depressed economy.  The jobs at the plant paid on 
average nearly $50,000, with many skilled jobs paying as much as $100,000 when 
overtime was factored in.97  These were, without question, the best paying jobs for miles 
around.  Most of the workers at the plant were represented by the United Auto Workers, 
93 See supra text accompanying notes 24-28.
94
  For a discussion of the rise of the class action sexual harassment claims see Melissa Hart, Litigation 
Narratives: Why Jensen v. Ellereth Didn’t Change Sexual Harassment Law, But Still Has a Story Worth 
Telling, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 282, 282-85 (2003) (book review).  As Hart notes, the actual number 
of cases that have been filed is relatively small, though they have received considerable attention in the 
media and among attorneys.  In addition to the cases listed in the text, a class action claim is currently 
pending against Combined Insurance Co.  See Mark Skertic, Sex Harassment Persists: Women Still Face 
Hostility in Workplace, CHI. TRIBUNE, May 11, 2003, at C1.
95 See Paul Jaskunas, EEOC v. Mitsubishi, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, July/August 1996, at 96 
(discussing the initial lawsuit).  For a discussion of the case with a particular focus on the role the unions 
played see Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor’s Divided Ranks: Privilege and the United Front 
Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1542, 1546-52, 1602-04 (1999).
96 See Ellen Warren & Nancy Millman, Abuse on the Line, CHI. TRIBUNE MAGAZINE, Feb. 15, 1998, at 
C10 (“The EEOC has said about 400 of the 940 women at the plant were subjected to sexual harassment by 
at least 400 of the more than 3,000 men there.”).
97 See Frank Swoboda, Hope and Hardship in Normal, Ill.: Once a Blue-Collar Savior, Mitsubishi 
Struggles Under Weight of Sluggish Sales, WASH. POST, April 29, 1996, at A9. 
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although the union contract made various concessions to Mitsubishi’s Japanese 
management and team concept, including the elimination of a standard clause that created 
a committee to resolve harassment claims.98  As a result, the claims of sexual harassment 
at the plant were left to an indifferent management to address.   
Both suits alleged a pervasive pattern of harassment that ran throughout the plant.  
A journalistic account described the allegations in this way:
As early as 1992, female employees at Mitsubishi began to 
complain of sexual misbehavior on the factory floor.  They reported 
obscene, crude sketches of genital organs and sex acts, and names of 
female workers scratched into unpainted car bodies moving along 
the assembly line.  Women were called sluts, whores and bitches 
and subjected to groping, forced sex play and male flashing.  
Explicit sexual graffiti such as KILL THE SLUT MARY were 
scrawled on rest-area and bathroom walls.  In a particularly 
egregious case, a worker put his air gun between a woman’s legs 
and pulled the trigger.  Declared a line supervisor: “I don’t want any 
bitches on my line.  Women don’t belong in the plant.99
Such behavior was so much the norm that when EEOC representatives visited the plant to 
conduct an investigation, no one had even bothered to remove the explicit sexual grafitti 
that lined the walls.100  Unwanted sexual advances from co-workers and supervisors were 
98
  It also appears that the union failed to exercise the power it had under the contract, and like 
management was largely indifferent to the harassing behavior at the plant.  See Camille Colatosti, 
Misrepresented Women Fight Harassment and the Union Boys’ Club, THE PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1, 1996, at 
36. One of the women represented by the EEOC stated that when she complained to her union 
representative, he responded by saying that he would help her if she first performed oral sex on him.  See
Ellen Warren and Nancy Millman, Abuse on the Line, CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 15, 1998, at C10; see also Crain, 
supra, note --, at 1548-52 (discussing the Union’s response) .  For a discussion of the ways in which unions 
have often slighted women and their interests see Marion Crain, Feminism, Labor, and Power, 65 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1819 (1992); Marion Crain, Labor, Unions, & Hostile Work Sexual Harassment: The Untold Story, 
4 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 9 (1995).   
99 Leon Jaroff, Assembly-Line Sexism?  Charges of Abusing Women – And Angry Denials – Rock a 
Midwestern Mitsubishi Auto Plant, TIME, May 6, 1996, at 56.
100 See id. at 56 (noting that when the EEOC investigators arrived at the plant they were “astounded to 
find that the company seemed unconcerned.  No one had even bothered to remove the widespread sexual 
graffiti.”).
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common, and strippers and prostitutes were hired to entertain at company parties when 
Japanese officials visited.101
After initially mounting an aggressive campaign to rebut the charges, Mitsubishi 
ultimately settled both claims for substantial sums.  The private lawsuit was settled for 
$9.5 million102 and shortly thereafter, the EEOC settled its lawsuit for $34 million and the 
imposition of a three-year monitoring group that was empowered to recommend 
necessary changes in employment practices.103  Under the EEOC’s suit, which remains 
the largest award in a sexual harassment case to date, more than 300 women recovered 
sums ranging from $25,000 to $300,000 with an average of approximately $100,000.104
Despite these settlements, a lengthy report in the New York Times questioned how much 
the plant had really changed, suggesting that once the case was settled and removed from 
the public’s eyes, there was little interest on the part of the company or the plaintiffs in 
pursuing substantial reform.105
Although Mitsubishi is the largest and best known case, Ford Motors has 
struggled with similar allegations over the last few years, even though its struggles have 
rarely captured national attention.  The initial allegations were focused on two plants 
outside of Chicago, and raised claims that were much like those directed at Mitsubishi – a 
gauntlet of harassment for Ford’s female employees on the factory floor including 
unwanted sexual advances, groping, name calling and visible pornography.106  Strippers 
101 See Ellen Warren & Nancy Millman, supra note --, at 10 (discussing parties with strippers). 
102 See Kristen Downey Grimsley, Mitsubishi Settlement Said to Total $9.5 Million:  Company Still 
Faces Larger Suit Filed by EEOC, WASH. POST, August 30, 1997, at F1. 
103 See Stephen Braun, Mitsubishi To Pay $34 Million in Sex Harassment Case, June 12, 1998, at A1. 
104 See Jon Bigness, Mitsubishi Settlement Checks on the Way, CHI. TRIBUNE, June 26, 1999, at C1.
105 See Reed Abelson, Can Respect be Mandated?  Maybe Not Here, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 10, 2000, at C1.
106 See Joann Muller, Ford: The High Cost of Harassment, BUS. WK., Nov. 15, 1999, at 94.
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and prostitutes also apparently made the rounds at the Ford plants.107  Ford eventually 
settled four separate lawsuits – three involving allegations of harassment, and one for 
denying women entry-level jobs in seven of its assembly plants.108   In addition to the 
claims against Mitsubishi and Ford, the EEOC also initiated, and later settled, class action 
sexual harassment claims against Astra Pharmaceuticals and Dial Corporation.  The Astra 
claim settled quickly for $10 million and led to the dismissal of its Chief Executive,109
whereas the Dial case recently settled for the same amount but only on the eve of trial 
after four years of contentious litigation.110
The cases just mentioned represent the largest and latest of the class action sexual 
harassment claims but the first to attain class action status involved charges of pervasive 
harassment at a mining company in northern Minnesota.  As was true with the Mitsubishi 
case, the mining jobs were the best jobs available in the rural area of Northern Minnesota 
where the mine was located.  The case against Eveleth Mines began in 1984 when three 
female miners filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  The 
107 See id. (describing a “years-long” pattern of groping, name-calling, and parties with strippers and 
prostitutes).   
108 See Sexual Harassment Suit is Settled by Ford Motor, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2002, at C14 (settling 
claim of three individuals); Ford Agrees to Pay $3.8 Million to Settle Discrimination Suit, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 22, 2000, at B16 (settlement with Department of Labor over hiring practices); Ford Increases Amount 
in Sex Harassment Pact, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2000 (settling class claim initiated by EEOC for $9 million 
in relief and $10 million for training); Joann Muller, Ford: The High Cost of Harassment, BUS. WK., Nov. 
15, 1999, at 94 (noting that the company had settled a private lawsuit for $2 million).  
109 See Kenneth N. Gilpin, Firm to Pay $10 Million in Settlement of Sex Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 
1998 at A16.  About 80 of the 120 female employees who were interviewed were eligible to file claims.  
See id.  The company subsequently sued its former Chief Executive, and a jury ordered the defendant to 
pay more than a million dollars for breach of duties and fraud.  See Bob Kievra, Jury Rules Against 
Bildman: Ex-Astra President Ordered to pay $1 M, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Feb. 22, 2002, at 
A1. The CEO of Florsheim also resigned due to allegations of harassment.  See Abraham McLaughlin, 
CEOS Getting the Boot for Sexual Misconduct, CHRISTIAN-SCIENCE MONITOR, July 2, 1999, at 1.  It should 
be noted that in neither case were the allegations of harassment the sole reason for the termination, but in 
each instance the executives had committed other wrongs that also factored into the companies decision to 
terminate them.   
110 See Sarah Ellison and Joann S. Lublin, Dial to Pay $10 Million to Settle a Sexual-Harassment 
Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., April 30, 2003, at B4.   On a smaller scale, the EEOC also filed and subsequently 
settled a class action sexual harassment case against Cheap Tickers, an on-line travel agent.  See Cheap 
Tickets Settles Harassment Suit, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003, at C9.
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case was subsequently certified as a class action in 1991.111   The case involved an all too 
familiar litany of harassment – groping, grabbing, stalking, pressure for sex, use of sexual 
language and pornography, men exposing themselves and masturbating on women’s 
clothes.  One young boy testified that he watched his mother pack her lunch each day, 
including a knife, mace and rope to tie the door shut in her work area.112
Unlike the other cases, the Eveleth Mines case went to trial, and the testimony at 
the trial painted a picture of a workplace defiantly hostile to women.  Testimony 
indicated that the personnel director would frequently comment that women belonged at 
home and pregnant, and that the union consciously decided to ignore the complaints so as 
to protect its male members.113  After the initial complaints were filed, a sign went up on 
a manager-controlled bulletin board that read, “Sexual harassment will not be reported, 
but it will be graded.”114  When the women employees asked for a portable bathroom 
near the mine, their request was refused as they were told that if they were to work like a 
man they would have to learn to “piss like a man.”115   Further testimony confirmed the 
plaintiffs’ allegations, and the plaintiffs ultimately prevailed in the lengthy trial.116
But the case did not end there.  The damages phase was assigned to a retired 
judge who appeared hostile to the plaintiffs throughout the proceedings, and ultimately 
awarded paltry amounts to the individual plaintiffs.  His decision, however, was reversed 
111 See Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 139 F.R.D. 657 (D. Minn. 1991); Sandra Sugawara, Class 
Action Sexual Harassment Suit Allowed: U.S. Court’s Ruling in Minnesota Case May Widen Use of Tactic, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1991, at D1.  
112
  Kristen Downey Grimsley, A Hostile Workplace: Into an Abyss of Sex Harassment at Eveleth Mine, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1996, at A1.
113 See id. ( “Union officials testified that, when presented with the complaints, they didn’t take action 
because they thought it was important to protect the men’s jobs.”).   See Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 
824 F. Supp. 847 (D. Minn. 1993).
114 See Grimsley, supra note 112, at A1. 
115
  John Tevlin, The Eveleth Mines Case, STAR TRIBUNE, Nov. 29, 1998, at 1A. 
116
  The case is chronicled in CLARA BINGHAM AND LAURA LEEDY GANSLER, CLASS ACTION: THE 
STORY OF LOIS JENSON AND THE LANDMARK CASE THAT CHANGED SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW (2002). 
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by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which remanded the damages phase for a jury 
trial.117  Just before that trial was set to begin, the individual plaintiffs settled with the 
lead plaintiff receiving more than $750,000, compared to the $25,000 award the judge 
had ordered for her.118 Although ultimately victorious in the case, the lead plaintiff, Lois 
Jenson, went on permanent disability and has not worked since 1992.119
III.  THE PERSISTENCE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION.
What do these, and other, cases tell us about the persistence of sex 
discrimination in the workplace?  On the one hand, these cases may be seen as a random 
collection of thirty or so cases that offer little meaning in the context of the broader labor 
market.  From this perspective, the cases might be seen as reflecting isolated incidents 
rather than entrenched patterns, which was precisely the defense raised in many of the 
cases.120  To be sure, this is hardly a scientific or statistical survey, and yet, it would be a 
mistake to dismiss these cases as abberational in nature. Indeed, a desire to dismiss the 
cases likely reflects the very societal perception regarding the persistence of 
discrimination that these cases directly challenge.  In other words, these cases appear 
abberational, or isolated, not because they are but because they fail to comport with our 
image of the changing nature of discrimination.  As a society, we have plainly concluded, 
long ago, that cases of overt exclusion have all but vanished from the workplace.121 But 
117 See Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997).
118 BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 116, at 284.
119 See Tevlin, supra note 115, at 8A.
120
  For example, Smith Barney sought to defend its case by claiming that the problems alleged were 
concentrated at the Garden City office in suburban New York.  See ANTILLA, supra note 23, at 142. 
121 See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 
GEO. L.J. 279, 340-50 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s doctrine reflects a societal desire to “wish 
away” discrimination); see also Rachel F. Moran, The Elusive Nature of Discrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV.
2365, 2417 (2003) (book review) (“The simple truth is that once Bull Connor and Lester Maddox are gone, 
once angry parents are not screaming, ‘Two, four, six, eight, we don’t want to integrate’ . . . it is hard to say 
precisely what discrimination means.”).
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as I discuss further below, our perceptions of discrimination may have changed far more 
than the reality of discrimination, and there is certainly strong reason to believe that 
intentional and overt discrimination remains a substantial barrier to workplace equality
for women.
These cases are also important in that they provide some of the best available 
evidence regarding the persistence of discrimination.  When it comes to understanding 
the persistence of gender inequality, both economics and sociology, where these issues 
are studied extensively, have turned to empirical analyses.  Yet, it is extremely difficult to 
establish discrimination through empirical studies, which is, I think, one reason why 
discrimination tends to exist at the margins in theories premised on empirical analysis.  
Outside of controlled studies that seek to match pairs on all relevant factors other than 
sex, identifying discrimination through empirical studies often proves elusive.  The 
match-paired studies, such as have recently been conducted with restaurants and 
orchestras,122 offer significant evidence of labor market discrimination, although even 
these studies are not without their critics.123  These studies, however, are difficult to 
conduct and few in number.  More commonly, an empirical study will seek to measure 
some other variable, such as the role of labor market experience in explaining gender 
122 See Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions 
on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715 (2000); David Neumark, Sex Discrimination in Restaurant 
Hiring: An Audit Study, 111 Q. J. ECON. 915 (1996).   The Goldin and Rouse study found that female 
musicians had a far greater likelihood of being hired if they auditioned behind a curtain, then when they 
were visible to the evaluators.   Many major orchestras have moved to having musicians audition behind a 
blind curtain to avoid any distinguishing characteristics other than their music, and the Goldin and Rouse 
study took advantage of the data that existed both before and after these changes in practice.  The Neumark 
study, on the other hand, was patterned on housing audit studies, and he had men and women with identical 
resumes apply for positions at restaurants in the Philadelphia area.  This study found that male resumes led 
to approximately three times as many interviews and five times as many job offers at high priced 
restaurants.  See id. at 933-36.  These studies are discussed at length in Christine Jolls, Is There a Glass 
Ceiling?  25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (2002). 
123
  For a discussion on the limits of testing audits, frequently used to document housing discrimination 
and more recently adapted in other areas see James J. Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, 12 J. OF ECON. 
PERSP. 101 (1998).
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inequities, and treat discrimination as an “unexplained variable,” one that remains as a 
background possibility but that is solidly in the background nonetheless.  For example, 
many studies have sought to explain the wage gap between men and women, and 
typically look to differences in experience or education to explain the observed pay 
disparities.124  These studies uniformly fail fully to explain the disparities but it is rare 
that a researcher will identify discrimination as the cause of the unexplained portion of 
the wage gap, principally because the study was not set up to measure discrimination but 
was instead designed to measure the influence of tenure or education on labor market 
patterns.125  As a result, empirical studies are generally not intended to measure 
discrimination, leaving case studies as some of the best available evidence of the 
discrimination that remains in the workplace.
This short discussion highlights another common and important problem with 
identifying discrimination.  When it comes to discrimination, and this is true of both race 
and sex discrimination, in and out of court, our standards of proof are extremely high.  
Rather than establishing discrimination as the underlying cause by a preponderance of the 
evidence, we typically require a level of proof that eliminates all other potential causes.   
As a result, the cases discussed in this article provide as potent evidence of ongoing 
124
   For a sampling of the rich literature see FRANCINE D. BLAU ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, 
MEN, AND WORK 134-43 (3d ed. 1998); Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Swimming Upstream: 
Trends in the Gender Wage Differential in the 1980s, 15 J. LAB. ECON. 1 (1997); Linda Datcher Loury, The 
Gender Earnings Gap Among College-Educated Workers, 50 INDUS. & LABOR REL. REV. 580 (1997).  I 
have discussed the literature and its limitations in Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 
78 N.C. L. REV. 708, 714-30 (2000). 
125
   Christine Jolls, who is sympathetic to identifying discrimination in these studies, comments, “The 
difficulty with the evidence here is that it is difficult to be sure that all non-sex differences – some of which 
may be subtle or difficult to observe – have been controlled for, and, unless all such differences have been 
controlled for, the residual cannot properly be attributed to sex.”  Jolls, supra note 122, at 11 (footnote 
omitted).   See also Van W. Kolpin & Larry D. Singell, Jr., The Gender Composition & Scholarly 
Performance of Economics Departments: A Test for Employment Discrimination, 49 INDUS. & LABOR REL.
Rvw. 408 (1996) (finding that female economists had published more than their male counterparts even 
though they tended to be hired at lower ranked schools but avoiding the conclusion that discrimination 
explained the discrepancy because not all other explanations had been eliminated).  
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discrimination as we are likely to find, and they should not be discounted because of the 
lack of supporting empirical data.126   In the end, the cases that percolate through the 
courts are often our best evidence of the persistence of discrimination.
A.  The Subtle Discrimination Hypothesis.
As noted earlier, these cases tell a story that differs substantially from the 
consensual story regarding the nature of contemporary discrimination.  The consensual 
story emphasizes how discrimination has become more subtle in nature, less overt, and 
often has to do with women’s childcare commitments, or more commonly, with an 
employer’s perceptions of a woman’s childcare commitments.127  In this story, there is 
also a blurring of lines as to what constitutes discrimination, particularly when the focus 
is on what is often defined as unconscious discrimination, or alternatively, on the balance 
many women seek to draw between their work and family obligations that may limit their 
labor market commitments.  With respect to unconscious discrimination, the actor is 
generally thought to have no desire to discriminate and is generally thought to be 
126
   Subjective interviews – asking those who are potential victims about their experiences – offer 
another possible means of identifying discrimination, and interviews with potential victims are frequently 
conducted.  See, e.g., Janet Rosenberg et al, Now That We Are Here: Discrimination, Disparagement, and 
Harassment at Work and the Experience of Women Lawyers, 7 GENDER & SOCIETY 415 (1993) (reporting 
results of survey of female lawyers’ perception of discrimination); Patricia Yancey Martin et al., Gender 
Bias and Feminist Consciousness Among Judges and Attorneys: A Standpoint Theory Analysis, 27 SIGNS 
665 (2002) (study of perceptions of discrimination among Florida Bar members).  However, these studies 
often fail to provide convincing information for the subject groups are small and frequently left on their 
own to define discrimination, or are provided a definition of discrimination, which may not comport with 
what a court would identify as discrimination.  Subjective interviews can serve important purposes, but like 
all of the various methods. they have their limits.  
127 See, eg., VIRGINIA VALIAN, supra note 9; JOAN WILLIAMS, supra note 10.  Joan Waldfogel has 
published a series of studies documenting the disparity in pay between women with children and those 
without, and suggested that improving public policies designed to facilitate childrearing may go a long 
ways toward reducing the pay disparities.  See Jane Waldfogel, The Family Gap for Young Women in the 
United States and Britain: Can Maternity Leave Make a Difference? 16 J. LAB. ECON. 505 (1998); Jane 
Waldfogel, Understanding the “Family Gap” for Women With Children, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 137 (1998); 
Jane Waldfogel, Family-Friendly Policies for Families with Young Children, 5 EMPL. RTS. & EMLOY. 
POL’Y J. 273 (2001). 
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unaware of the way in which his acts adversely affect women.128 The recent turn within 
law to focus on women’s role as caretakers, and the ways in which society ought to give 
primacy to that role, suggests that many of the observed labor market inequities arise 
from women’s dual roles as mothers and labor market participants.129  This is certainly 
not a new issue and indeed the tension between women’s roles as workers and mothers 
has long been embodied in our nation’s social policy, which has tended towards 
protecting and defining women as mothers.130
The cases discussed in this paper offer a different picture:  there was nothing 
subtle about the discrimination in any of the cases, nor was the discrimination tied to 
women’s childcare responsibilities. Instead the cases represent the kind of behavior that 
many had previously defined out of existence in today’s labor market:  overt acts of 
hostility and exclusion based on stereotypes regarding women’s proper roles or abilities 
128
   The two most influential and insightful articles on what is sometimes referred to as unconscious 
discrimination are Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) and Charles R. 
Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 317 (1987).  For additional recent discussions see Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: 
Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1241 (2002); Martha Chamallas, Defining 
the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74  S. CAL. L. REV. 747 (2001); 
TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS (2002).  
129 See WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 65-77.  The recent focus on caretaking develops an argument that 
has an antecedent in neoclassical economics, which has long sought to explain observed labor market 
inequalities based on women’s roles in the home.  For classic statements of this position see GARY S. 
BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 41-42 (1991) (“Wage rates are lower for women a least partly 
because they invest less than men in market human capital, while the productivity in household time is 
presumably greater for women partly because they invest more than men in household capital.”); Solomon 
William Polachek, Occupational Self-Selection: A Human Capital Approach to Sex Differences in 
Occupational Structure, 63 REV. ECON. & STAT. 60, 65-68 (1981) (arguing that women self-select into 
occupations that match their preferences).  Although there are similarities between the neoclassical 
argument and the focus on caretaking, the differences are more profound.  In particular, the caretaking 
literature seeks to identify ways to remedy the penalties women suffer, while the neoclassical position does 
not see the disparities as penalties in need of remedy but instead reflect differing interests and 
specialization.     
130
  For an excellent historical overview of the gendered vision that has influenced social policy see 
ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC 
CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001).  Kessler-Harris writes:  “[T]he use of the family to 
justify and rationalize women’s disadvantaged workforce position functions as a set of ideological and 
material blinders that limits women’s access to the full range of economic life and shapes the nature of 
male as well as female experience.”  Id. at 12 (footnote omitted).     
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in the workplace.  In both the securities and grocery industry cases, the employers based 
their policies on a presumption that women were less committed to the workplace and 
were less interested in pursuing career paths that would lead to power and influence but 
that would also seemingly require intense devotion.  Importantly, these assumptions were 
not grounded in fact; no studies had been conducted by any of the companies to 
document women’s interests nor did the companies provide any hard evidence that their 
assumptions were true.  Rather, the company’s assumptions were based on management’s 
perceptions regarding women’s interests.131  This was particularly true in the securities 
cases where many of the plaintiffs were women who had worked long and uninterrupted 
careers and were earning high incomes even while they were restricted in their 
opportunities.132  The experience of these women should have provided an important 
counterweight to the underlying stereotypes but their failure to do so sheds light  on some 
of the other factors that contributed to the hostility so many of the women faced, 
including a desire by men to preserve their workplace advantages, an issue that will be 
discussed in more detail shortly.   
The grocery store cases, as well as the cases against Home Depot and Wal-Mart, 
are more difficult to label, as neither case included allegations of harassment but instead 
they seem to be cases involving common stereotypes regarding women as mothers and 
men as breadwinners.  All of the retail cases included allegations that the companies 
would ask women about their husband’s jobs or salaries, and most also included claims 
131
   Occasionally, as in the Publix litigation, the company would survey some of its female employees 
as a means of providing evidence during the litigation.  See Shores v. Publix Super Markets, No. 95-1162, 
CIV-T-28(E), 1996 Westlaw 407850, at *7 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (detailing study).  But outside of the litigation, 
none of the companies had investigated the reason for their segregated workforces.  See, e.g., Stender v. 
Lucky Stores, 803 F. Supp. at 292 (observing that Lucky’s had never conducted a survey to guage women’s 
actual interests).
132 See text accompanying notes 23 and 52 , supra.
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that management justified paying men higher wages because of their family 
commitments.133  Stereotyping also appeared to be at work in the particular assignments –
for example, keeping women off the sales floor at Home Depot and out of the meat 
department in the grocery stores.
Despite the lack of apparent hostility towards women, these cases seem best 
classified as involving claims of overt rather than subtle discrimination.  Certainly the 
claims regarding women’s husbands or their commitments were not subtle in nature, and 
there was nothing about the structure of the workplace that necessarily disadvantaged 
women.  Retail hours can be flexible, and the various shifts that are designed around the 
lengthy hours the stores are open can likewise enable women to work when their children 
are at school or their husbands are at home.  Indeed, the often obsessive focus on the need 
for flexible work conditions ignores the flexibility that higher wages and greater 
management responsibility can bring.134 Instead of structural concerns, it was again the 
employers’ perceptions of women’s interests that likely caused the disparities – their 
perception that women would not be willing to move to different stores or to work at 
night, neither of which was substantiated to any degree in the cases.135  In this respect, 
these cases resemble the famed case brought against Sears Roebuck, a case in which 
women were typically assigned to salaried rather than commission positions and one in 
133 See text accompanying note 40 supra; see also More than 900 Women File Claims of Bias in Merrill 
Lynch Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1999, at C2 (noting that “women were told they earned less than men 
because their husbands could support them.”); Reed, supra note 39, at 35 (Merrill Lynch broker Anne 
Marie Kearney claimed that in her interview she was asked how much money her husband made).  
134
  As Barbara Reskin notes, “The higher pay and better benefits of male jobs are particularly attractive 
to women supporting families . . . .”  Barbara Reskin, Sex Segregation in the Workplace, 19 ANN. RVW. OF 
SOCIOLOGY, 241, 264 (1993).     
135
  In the case against Lucky’s stores, the court listed the range of excuses the company raised, “women 
do not want to work late shifts, men don’t want to compete with women or have a woman as their boss . . . 
that women do not have the drive to get ahead.”  Stender, 803 F. Supp. at 332.  The court defined these 
excuses as discriminatory and based on stereotypes rather than any actual evidence.  Id.
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which the employer successfully defended the case by claiming that the assignments were 
the product of women’s interests rather than discriminatory practices.136
Although the cases discussed earlier are largely inconsistent with the subtle 
discrimination story, they are consistent with a story regarding segregation in the labor 
market that has been well documented.  Much has been written regarding the segregated 
nature of the workforce, in particular about how segregation affects the gender wage gap, 
and while there is little consensus regarding how much of the gap can be attributed to sex
segregation, few can doubt the extreme levels of segregation that continue to exist in the 
labor market.137  Moreover, the progress that has been made since 1970 when women 
began to enter the workforce in less traditional occupations and today has been modest, 
and by almost any measure, far less than was expected thirty years ago when the civil 
rights laws began to be enforced.138    For example, women accounted for 97.6% of all 
secretaries in 1970 and by 2000 the figure was 98.0%.  In 2000, women still comprised 
92.8% of registered nurses, 98.5% of Pre-K and kindergarten teachers, but only 3.8% of 
firefighters and 3.7% of airline pilots.139  A recent report indicated that only 1 in five 
136 See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff’d 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 
1988).
137
   An “index of segregation” has been developed to measure the level of occupational segregation that 
exists.  The index measures the percentage of women who would have to change occupations in order to 
achieve a integrated workforce, and depending on the particular measure that is used, it is estimated that 
more than half of women would have to change jobs to achieve equal representation among occupations.  
See DAPHNE SPAIN & SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, BALANCING ACT: MOTHERHOOD, MARRIAGE, AND 
EMPLOYMENT AMONG AMERICAN WOMEN 94 (1996); see also Francine D. Blau, Trends in Well-Being of
American Women, 1970-1995, 36 J. OF ECON. LIT. 112, 132 (1998) (finding that 53% of women would 
have had to switch jobs in 1990).     
138 See Reskin, supra note 134, at 245-48.   For two recent discussions of the persistence of sex 
segregation see Stephanie Boraas & William M. Rodgers, How Does Gender Play a Role in the Earnings 
Gap?  An Update, MONTHLY LABOR RVW., Mar. 2003, at 9; Phillip N. Cohen & Matt L. Huffman, 
Occupational Segregation and the Devaluation of Women’s Work Across U.S. Labor Markets, 81 SOCIAL 
FORCES 881 (2003). 
139
  These figures are drawn from ALICE ABEL KEMP, WOMEN’S WORK: DEGRADED AND DEVALUED
(1994) and DEBRA BARBEZAT, Occupational Segregation Around the World, 177-98, in WOMEN, FAMILY, 
AND WORK (Karine S. Moe ed., 2003).
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teachers are men, which marked a new forty-year low.140   It would be easy to continue 
the list but the point has been widely recognized; what has been less recognized is the 
way in which contemporary discrimination preserves the occupational structure and just 
how difficult it can be for women who are entering traditionally male professions 
whether those professions are at the top of the pay scale (securities) or fall in the middle 
(miners) or tend towards the bottom (retail).  In each instance, women continue to face 
substantial barriers to successful integration, and are clearly left with a different set of 
choices than their male counterparts.
B.  Preserving Male Norms.
The cases discussed previously are also consistent with a theory of sexual 
harassment recently advanced by a number of feminist legal scholars. In an important 
article, Professor Kathryn Abrams has suggested that we should view sexual harassment 
as an attempt by men to preserve male norms in the workplace.141 Abrams defines sexual 
harassment “as a phenomenon that serves to preserve male control and entrench 
masculine norms in the workplace.”142  In this way, she argues, “[s]exual harassment 
feminizes women by throwing them off balance in the work environment and depriving 
them of opportunities the workplace could provide to chart new, more independent 
courses and to explore different conceptions of self.”143  Under this perspective, sexual 
harassment is less about sexual desire, and more about preserving male norms that 
effectively exclude women from participation.  Professor Vicki Schultz has advanced a 
140 See Men in Teaching Fall to a 40-Year Low, Survey Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at A26 
(“Two out of 10 teachers are men, the lowest figure in 40 years, a survey by the National Education 
Association has found.”).  
141 See Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 
(1998).
142 Id. at 1172. 
143 Id. at 1219.
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similar theory, arguing that the judicial focus on sexual acts as the paramount form of 
sexual harassment obscures the many other ways in which male dominance is 
preserved.144
The theories developed by Abrams and Schultz are typically contrasted with what 
is known as the social dominance theory, around which much of the doctrine relating to 
sexual harassment has been developed.  Under this theory, sexual harassment in the 
workplace is about sexual desire and power, and it is typically defined with reference to 
sexual activity.145  Workplace surveys that seek to measure the extent of sexual 
harassment almost always define harassment in precisely this way.146
Although these theories are not necessarily incompatible and both approaches 
accurately describe behavior that occurs within the workplace, the theories that focus on 
preserving male norms better capture much of the behavior delineated in the cases 
discussed earlier.  It is perhaps easiest to illustrate the relevance of sexual harassment 
144 See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).  More 
recently, Professor Schultz has adopted somewhat of a different approach, contending that sexual 
harassment doctrine has driven sexuality out of the workplace in a way that is not necessarily advantageous 
for women.  See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003).  In the more recent 
article, Professor Schultz emphasizes the importance of having an integrated workplace as a way of 
breaking down workplace barriers for women.  See id. at 2151-52 (“Taken together, the studies suggest that 
more integrated, egalitarian employment settings give both women and men more power to resist 
stereotypes and, in so doing, to remake the culture of sexuality on their own terms.”)  While I agree with 
the emphasis on integrated workplaces, I am less certain that the enforcement of sexual harassment laws 
have somehow put women at a disadvantage, particularly when compared to the realities of the workplace.  
Professor Schultz’s notion that we ought to have lots of different workplaces, and women ought to have 
lots of different choices for how much sexuality they have in the workplace, might be desirable in an ideal 
labor market, but given that our current situation is so far removed from the ideal one must choose among 
second or even third-best alternatives, and in that realm vigorous enforcement of the laws may be the best 
we can offer.           
145
  This theory is generally associated with the work of Catherine MacKinnon, whose early work was 
influential in helping to shape sexual harassment doctrine in the courts.  See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 42 (1987) (describing her approach as the “dominance approach”); CATHERINE A. 
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979) (discussing sexual harassment as a 
possible cause of action under Title VII). 
146
  In her recent exhaustive survey of existing sexual harassment policies, Vicki Schultz concluded, “It 
is clear that both those who conduct the surveys and those who respond to them define harassment in terms 
of sexual acts, language and materials.”  Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, supra note 144, at 2095 n.97.  
For one well-known example of such a survey see U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES 5 (1994). 
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theory by looking to the securities cases.  These cases included very little overt sexual 
advances or behavior – men were not interested in their female counterparts as sexual 
objects but were instead intent on creating an environment that conveyed express hostility 
to women, making it clear through their actions that women were neither wanted nor 
would they necessarily be tolerated.  The “boom boom” room was one manifestation of 
this exclusion.  This was a place that was literally off-limits to women and where men 
could go for male-bonding rituals that perhaps offered the comfort of knowing that the 
workplace had not changed from the days when the professional staff was exclusively 
male.  
The same was true in the grocery store cases where the job assignments made 
clear that women were seen as marginal employees, and that their primary fidelity should 
be to their families.  While women were allowed to perform many of the necessary 
menial tasks, such as working the cash registers, they would not be accepted in the higher 
echelons of management because these were rungs preserved for men.147  The grocery 
store cases rarely contained the sensational allegations of harassment or boorish behavior 
that was central to the securities cases, but the means of exclusion were designed to 
preserve male workplace norms, and equally important, they were designed to preserve 
gender norms outside of the workplace by emphasizing women’s commitments to their 
family over their commitments to work.
This latter point is important to emphasize given that we often focus on the ways 
in which harassing behavior is tied to preserving norms within the workplace, but it does 
147 See, e.g.,CYNTHIA COCKBURN, IN THE WAY OF WOMEN: MEN’S RESISTANCE TO SEX EQUALITY IN 
ORGANIZATIONS (1991) (arguing that men resist gender integration so as to preserve their privileged 
positions within firms); Gertrud M. Fremling & Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, With 
Particular Application to Sexual Harassment, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1084-85 (1999) (arguing that men 
may want to expel women from the workplace to preserve their status, which can be challenged when 
women enter).
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much more than that.  By treating women as marginal employees, and by assuming that 
they will not want to relocate or work the long hours necessary to move forward, the 
workplace norms reach far beyond the workplace to help maintain stereotypes and gender 
roles in the home as well.  In this way, the gender norms preserve men’s status both in 
and outside the workplace.148  The perpetuation of gendered parenting reaffirms these 
roles as women have found that, despite the pervasive rhetoric propounding equal 
parenting, they still perform the majority of work in the home, whether caring for 
children or the home itself.149
We see the same interactions at work in the sexual harassment cases, none of 
which involved sexual overtures or advances as a central part of the claims.  Although 
there was overtly sexual behavior in some of the cases, most of even the sexual behavior 
was too crude to be taken as anything other than an attempt to harass rather than to 
seduce. The behavior at issue in Mitsubishi, Eleveth Mines, Ford Motors and the other 
class action harassment cases, involved disciplining women’s entry into male-dominated 
jobs as a way of preserving the norms that had previously existed.  This was not behavior 
designed to have women act more like men, but it was instead intended to preserve a 
male space that excluded women regardless of how “male” their behavior may have been, 
or how willing women might have been to fit in.150  Many of the women in the securities 
148
  Christine Williams has written:  “Men have historically used the occupational realm not only to 
serve economic advantages over women, but also to establish and affirm their essential difference from –
and personal sense of superiority over – women.”  CHRISTINE L. WILLIAMS, GENDER DIFFERENCES AT 
WORK: WOMEN AND MEN IN NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS 133 (1989).
149 See Joni Hersch & Leslie S. Stratton, Housework, Fixed Effects and Wages of Married Women, 32 J. 
HUMAN RESOURCES 285, 289-90 (1997) (finding that in sample studied women averaged approximately 
three times as much housework a week as men).  For a thorough discussion of studies on housework see 
Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor Into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 N.W. U. L. REV. 1, 8-10 
(1996).
150
   Katherine Franke has argued that sexual harassment is often designed to create normalized sexual 
behavior so that men or women who step out of the traditional sex roles are most frequently the subject of 
harassment.  See Katherine Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment? 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997).  
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cases were aggressive, hard-working and high-earning, and yet they were still subjected 
to harassing and exclusionary behavior.  As the Court of Appeals explained in its 
decision in the Eveleth Mines case, much of the workplace harassment was designed “to 
destroy the human psyche as well as the human spirit” of the plaintiffs.151
This desire to preserve male norms reflects two often unacknowledged social 
phenomena.  For men, preserving male norms can be defined, at least in one sense, as 
rational behavior.  Studies continually demonstrate that female-dominated jobs suffer a 
wage penalty, and that those positions dominated by men receive a substantial wage 
premium.152  Beyond the economic advantages, sociologists Susan Fiske and Peter Glick 
have observed that men may feel threatened by the introduction of women into male-
dominated jobs because “jobs that are dominated by men are seen as requiring traits that 
distinguish men as superior to women.”153  Breaking down these barriers may threaten 
The class action cases offer little support for this theory, as the behavior was never aimed at disciplining 
men or women who were seen as atypical, other than perhaps women who were entering nontraditional 
professions.  This, of course, does not mean that Franke’s theory would not describe sexual harassment 
targeted at individuals, but it does suggest that it may not account for systemic patterns of harassment. 
151
  Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d at 1304. 
152
 A large number of studies have established a strong relationship between occupational segregation 
and the wage gap.  See, e.g., Paula England et al., The Effect of Sex Composition of Jobs on Starting Wages 
in an Organization: Findings from the NLSY, 33 DEMOGRAPHY 511, 520 (1996) (“These findings add to 
the cumulating evidence that those who work in female-dominated jobs pay a wage penalty – that 
employers assign them lower wages than if the job had a larger proportion of men working in it.”); Judith 
Fields & Edward N. Wolff, Interindustry Wage Differentials and the Gender Wage Gap, 49 INDUS. & 
LABOR REL. RVW. 105, 116-18 (1995) (finding that women were concentrated in lower paying industries 
which explained between “31% to 38% of the overall gender wage gap”.)  There remains a significant gap 
in the college majors students choose, which may help explain some of the observed occupational 
segregation.  See Sarah E. Turner & William G. Bowen, Choice of Majors: The Changing (Unchanging) 
Gender Gap, 52 INDUS. & LABOR REL. RVW. 289, 308 (1999) (noting that gender gap in majors had not 
decreased despite women’s changing employment patterns). 
153
   Susan T. Fiske and Peter Glick, Ambivalent and Stereotypes Cause Sexual Harassment: A Theory 
With Implications for Organizational Change,” 51 J. OF SOCIAL ISSUES 97, 105 (1995) (internal references 
omitted).  See also Karen D. Pyke, Class-Based Masculinities: The Interdependence of Gender, Class, and 
Interpersonal Power, 10 GENDER & SOCIETY 527, 545 (1996) (“In doing gender, men and women engage 
in practices that promote male dominance and female subordination in most social contexts.”).
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men’s own sense of their selves, while likewise threatening their substantial occupational 
status and accompanying advantages independent of the earnings premium.154
This perceived threat directly relates to another lurking explanation for why men 
may seek to preserve male norms in the workplace through practices of hostility and
exclusion.  Despite our professed allegiance to a world of sexual equality, there remains a 
deep social ambivalence regarding exactly what such a world would look like.  Polls 
consistently demonstrate a curious nostalgia for returning to the sex roles characteristic of 
the 1950s where many women tended to stay home after marriage and certainly after 
having children.  A 1996 poll by the Washington Post found that nearly forty percent of 
the respondents desired to return to traditional home life where the wife worked only 
inside the home.155  Other polls have largely replicated these findings.  For example, in a 
2000 survey conducted by International Communications Research, 69% of 18 to 30 year 
olds and 80% of 45 to 60 year olds agreed with the statement: “It may be necessary for 
mothers to be working because the family needs the money, but it would be better if she 
could stay home and take care of the house and children.”156  A recent poll conducted by 
the nonprofit Public Agenda asked respondents to choose between creating public 
policies that would allow one family member to stay home and policies intended to 
154
  The economist Claudia Goldin has defined this phenomenon as a pollution theory of discrimination 
where women are seen as “polluting” the occupation.  See Claudia Goldin, A Pollution Theory of 
Discrimination: Male and Female Differences in Occupations and Earnings, National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 8985 (June 2002) (on file with author).  See also Marianne LaFrance, The 
Schemas  and Schemes in Sex Discrimination, 65 BROOKLYN LAW REV. 1063, 1069-70 (1999) 
(“[W]henever there is disadvantage, there is also advantage.  Women are under-benefited because males 
are privileged.”).
155 See Richard Morin & Megan Rosenfeld, With More Equity, More Sweat, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 
1998, at A1 (“4 in 10 of those surveyed said, it would be better to return to the gender roles of the 1950s”).
156 See Pamela Paul, Meet the Parents, 24 AMER. DEMOGRAPHICS 1 (Jan. 1, 2002).  See also American 
Academy of Pediatrics, FAMILY PEDIATRICS: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE FAMILY, June 1, 2003 
“(In a recent public opinion survey 41% of women thought that a family in which the father worked and the 
mother stayed at home was best for raising children; only 17% said it was beneficial for children and 
society to have mothers work outside the home.”). 
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provide more public child care as a way to help families balance their work and family 
obligations.  Sixty-two percent of the respondents chose policies that would enable one 
parent to stay home.157  In reviewing the literature on housework, Virginia Valian found 
that there was a consensus between men and women that “women should do most of the 
housework.”158
This societal ambivale nce has recently found its way into legal scholarship in the 
form of an emphasis on the importance of caretaking to women.  Joan Williams, Martha 
Fineman and other feminist legal scholars have recently advocated creating more public 
policies that would facilitate women’s caretaking roles.159  These policies might include 
public subsidies for caretaking, limits on hours worked and the creation of more flexible 
jobs that would presumably be more family friendly if not necessarily more career 
friendly.  I, and others, have written critically of this trend, and I will not rehash those 
arguments here, other than to say that this turn towards caretaking represents a substantial 
rethinking of what exactly sex equality means.160  My sense is that this rethinking is 
borne largely out of frustration with the limited progress that has been made towards
equal parenting, and the ways in which women’s entry in the workplace has not 
necessarily resulted in more of a sharing of the work in the home.161  Nevertheless, it 
157 See Public Agenda Online, Survey Organization (2003) (poll was conducted in June 2000) 
(available at www.publicagenda.org/issues/major_proposals_detail2.cfm?issue_type=childecare, last 
visited July 31, 2003).
158 VALIAN, supra note 9, at 40.  Professor Valian noted that until their workload reaches 75%, most 
married women see their division of labor as fair.  See id.
159 See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 10; Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 1403 (2001) (arguing for a greater public emphasis on caretaking).  For a treatment of the 
topic aimed at popular audience see ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST 
IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED  (2001).
160 See Michael Selmi, Care Work and the Road to Equality: A Commentary on Fineman and Williams, 
76 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1557 (2001); Naomi Cahn & Michael Selmi, Caretaking and the Contradictions of 
Contemporary Policy, MAINE L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 2002).
161 See, e.g., Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 57 (2001).  Naomi Cahn has 
recently argued that resistance to change may be attributable in part to women’s desire to preserve their 
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seems to reflect our societal ambivalence toward breaking down gender stereotypes in a 
way that might be transformative.162
The societal view that it would be best for women to remain home with their 
children are plainly reflected in the class action cases.  Every reported case included 
statements from management officials that women would be paid less than men because 
they did not have a family to support, and often these statements were accompanied by 
blanket declarations that women were not appropriate for management positions because 
of their family responsibilities.163  The class action against the rental company, Rent-A-
Center, provides an extreme example of such behavior.  In that case, which subsequently 
settled for $47 million, one regional director was quoted as saying, “I have never had one 
female store manager working for me and have never promoted a woman,” while another 
stated that “Women should be home taking care of their husbands and children, chained 
to the stove, not working in my store.”164
own power, given that the realm of caretaking has been one of the areas where women have been able to 
dominate and obtain power.  See Naomi R. Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 177 
(2000).
162
  Catherine Fisk has wonderfully captured this ambivalence in a recounting of the paths of her friends 
from college, all of whom went on to obtain professional degrees but half of whom have since left the labor 
market to stay home full-time.  See Catherine Fisk, In Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for 
Economic Citizenship in 20th-Century America, 51 BUFFALO L. REV. 409, 409-11 (2003) (book review)   
In an interesting history of women’s movement towards equality, Robert Jackson argues that feminists have 
had their greatest legislative successes when they have reinforced rather than challenged existing 
stereotypes.  He writes:  “Government responses to modern feminist agitation suggest that feminist efforts 
to affect national legislation succeeded only when they defined the issues narrowly, minimizing potential 
effects on gender roles.  Feminists did influence legislation, such as laws that provided women equal access 
to credit, required schools receiving federal funds to give equivalent support to girls’ athletics, and required 
disability plans to cover pregnancy leaves.  These successes seem to have occurred because none of these 
laws threatened to initiate significant changes in the status of women or the relations between the sexes.”  
ROBERT MAX JACKSON, DESTINED FOR EQUALITY: THE INEVITABLE RISE OF WOMEN’S STATUS 201 (1998).  
163 See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
164 See Wilfong v. Rent-A-Center, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22718 *29 (E.D. Missouri 2001); see also
Kristin Downey Grimsley, 4,800 Women in Class to Sue Rent-A-Center: U.S. Judge Cites Allegations of 
Company-Wide Bias, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2001, at E1.  Among other practices challenged in Rent-A-
Center was a requirement that all employees be able to lift 75 pounds, a requirement that had been 
increased from 50 pounds without any apparent justification.  See Grimsley, supra.  This is reminiscent of 
some of the obstacles that were literally placed in women’s paths when they sought positions in fire 
departments in the 1970s.  See Berkman v. City of New York, 536 F.Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).  In 1974, 
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In one respect, it is not all that difficult to understand why men might want to try 
to preserve workplace norms in which they both dominate and prosper, but it is more 
difficult to understand why employers would tolerate these efforts.  Excluding women 
from the workplace has the potential to be economically inefficient insofar as the firm 
would be excluding productive employees for noneconomic reasons.  Economic theory 
suggests that firms will eschew such behaviors, or that nondiscriminatory firms would
provide a disciplining force for the market by hiring the excluded workers and thus 
lowering labor costs.165  Yet, these cases make clear that inefficient exclusion and 
harassment frequently occur even in sophisticated workplaces, and it is a serious puzzle 
why this behavior persists, particularly at levels that approach industry-wide patterns of 
discrimination such as in the securities and grocery industries.
It is possible that the discriminatory practices discussed in this article are efficient 
in the sense that the firms gain more in productivity from their male employees than was 
lost by the exclusion  or harassment of female employees.  This might occur if the most 
productive male employees gravitate towards firms with a culture that permits male 
dominance.  It may also be that these male employees are willing to forego salary in 
return for working in such a workplace culture, that these workers gain greater utility 
from a male-dominated environment than they might from higher salaries.  In other 
words, male brokers would effectively agree to work for Smith Barney rather than one of 
just after women began to apply to the fire department and just after Title VII became applicable to public 
employers, the City of New York modified its physicial agility examination to require the scaling of an 
eight- foot wall, which the vast majority of the female applicants were unable to do.   The district court 
found the wall to be a “literal” barrier to women’s employment and also found that it was not job-related.  
Id. at 194.     
165
  The standard reference for this argument is GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION
153-60 (2d ed. 1971).   The theory is considerably more complicated than stated above.  For additional 
discussions see Selmi, supra note 4, at 1317-20; Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination, in 3 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS § 31 (2000).    
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its competitors precisely because male norms were preserved in one but not the other, or 
that in the grocery stores, men would only agree to begin their careers at the bottom of 
the firm ladder to the extent they would not have to compete, or conceivably work, with 
women.
For this to be the case, men would have to be substantially more productive than 
even the best female employees, and there is certainly no reason to assume, absent some 
proof, that this is the case.  On the contrary, a number of published studies demonstrate 
that women are no less productive than their male counterparts.166  There is, however, 
some support for the notion that homogenous work groups are more productive  than 
heterogenous groups,167 and it may be that management’s tolerance for the practices can 
be defended in this manner.  Yet, the evidence in support of the homogeneity thesis is 
limited and mixed, and there is little about the evidence that could be described as 
compelling.168  Moreover, if true, this thesis could not defend the harassing behavior at 
issue in so many of the cases, but instead might be consistent with discriminatory 
assignments or promotions.  
There is one other possibility that might justify the exclusionary practices based 
on an efficiency rationale.  Some of the discriminatory behavior might be consistent with 
166
   Although the studies are few in number, those that have sought to measure productivity differences 
between men and women have generally found no significant differences.  See Harry J. Holzer, The 
Determinants of Employee Productivity and Earnings, 29 INDUS. REL. 403, 415 (1990) (finding that 
women had “comparable productivity” but “much lower wages” than men).  A recent study of male and 
female veterinarians found that producitivy differences could not explain wage differences.  See David M. 
Smith, Pay and Productivity Differences Between Male and Female Veterinarians, 55 INDUS. & LABOR 
REL. Rvw. 493 (2002) (finding that 15% pay differential could not be explained by productivity factors).  
167
  The evidence is collected and discussed extensively in  Devon W. Carbado and Mitu Gulati, The 
Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757 (2003) (book review).
168
  A review of the existing literature concluded:  “Diversity [in the workplace] thus appears to be a 
double-edged sword, increasing the opportunity for creativity as well as the likelihood that group members 
will be dissatisfied and fail to identify with the group.”  Francis J. Milliken & Luis L. Martins, Searching 
for Common Threads: Understanding the Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organizational Groups, 21 
ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 402, 403 (1996).  
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customer desires or expectations, and in this way customer discrimination might help 
explain why the practices persist.169 Customers might prefer men at the meat counter,  
men handling their financial matters or making their automobiles, but simply to state this 
proposition is to reveal its limits.  A majority of shoppers are women, an increasing 
number of investors are likewise women, and it seems unlikely that they would have a 
strong preference for dealing exclusively with men, just as it seems quite unlikely that 
anyone would particularly care who assembled automobiles (or cut meat or handled the 
vegetables).170  And as was true with the notion of women’s preferences, no company has 
produced any data to support the notion that customer discrimination helps explain the 
discriminatory policies.  Of course, this might be because customer discrimination has 
not been accepted as a legal justification for discriminatory policies,171 but it also seems 
that more likely assumed customer preferences, rather than actual preferences, underlie 
management acceptance.  Indeed, it seems entirely implausible that these practices can be 
defended on an efficiency basis but instead they appear to indicate that employers are 
willing to forego profits in order to tolerate discriminatory practices despite their effects 
on the firm’s profitability.
169 See Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, § 
31, 568 (2000) (“Perhaps a more important explanation for long-run discrimination is that profit-
maximizing employers in competitive markets will cater to the discriminatory tastes of employees or 
customers.”).  One recent study found a strong correlation between the race of customers and the race of 
employees, particularly with respect to African Americans, which the authors considered consistent with a 
theory of customer discrimination.  See Harry J. Holzer & Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Customer Discrimination 
and Employment Outcomes for Minority Workers, 113 Q. J. ECON. 835 (1998). 
170
  For example, it is estimated that four in ten women shop at Wal-Mart in any given week.  See Liz 
Featherstone, Wal-Mart’s Female Trouble, NATION, Dec. 3, 2002, at 18. 
171
  The best known of these cases involved Southwest Airlines’ attempt to only hire female flight 
attendants to cater to the interests of its male passengers.  See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 
292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).  A more recent variant involved a famous Miami Beach restaurant’s attempt to hire 
only male waiters so as to create a European ambiance.  See EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 
1263 (11th Cir. 2000).    
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Rather than focusing on these explanations, management’s inability to root out 
inefficient practices likely stems from management’s own perceptions and biases, 
perceptions and biases that often mirror those of their male employees.  Certainly this 
seems true of all of the cases discussed in this article – the behavior described in the 
securities, grocery store and harassment cases all had lengthy pedigrees and originated 
during a time when the workplaces were exclusively male.  Boorish behavior denigrating 
women was, for many, the norm, and not seen as something that required change but was 
rather part of the camaraderie of the workplace. In the grocery industry, the fact that 
management was comprised almost exclusively of men appeared normal, and was 
consistent with the gender schema that dominated the workplace.  More than anything 
else, the explanations offered by management and others that women were not interested 
in the demands that came with management opportunities helped fit the reality to the 
perceptions rather than aligning the perceptions with reality.
In this way, the gendered nature of institutions becomes invisible because it is 
seen as the natural order of things.  Joan Acker has written about the way in which gender 
infiltrates organizations and its processes, noting that “[m]anagers’ decisions often 
initiate gender divisions, and organizational practices maintain them.”172  She contends 
that gendered nature of institutions is obscured because the organization is theorized in 
gender-neutral terms.173  She concludes, “Understanding how the appearance of gender 
172
  Joan Acker, Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations, 4 GENDER AND 
SOCIETY 139, 146 (1990). 
173 See Joan Acker, From Sex Roles to Gendered Institutions, 21 CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY 565 
(1992).
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neutrality is maintained in the face of overwhelming evidence of gendered structures is 
an important part of analyzing gendered institutions.”174
Theories of social psychology also help us understand why sex-based 
discriminatory practices can persist even where they are demonstrably inefficient.175 To 
the extent the discriminatory practices are left over from an era of exclusively male 
workplaces, management may not have seen any need to change what they had always 
done, and what had been perceived to work in the past.  This fidelity to past practices, 
common to organizational structures, may have likewise enabled firms to discount the 
complaints that arose from the female employees.
Indeed, in an era of perceived hyperregulation of the workplace, where all firms 
now have sexual harassment policies and many enforce them vigorously,176 one of the 
most puzzling aspects of the class action cases is why the complaints were consistently 
ignored.  For example, in the Smith Barney case, the complaints of Pamela Martens fell 
upon deaf ears, even though a representative from the corporate office did make a token 
appearance to observe the office after the initial complaints.177  The complaints that were 
raised would have been relatively easy to investigate, which was true of most the 
securities cases, and yet in none of the cases did the firms perform any substantial 
investigation before a lawsuit was filed.178  In some instances, like the Smith Barney 
174 Id. at 568.
175
  For an insightful discussion of how social psychology can provide insights into organizational 
inequality see James N. Baron & Jeffrey Pfeffer, The Social Psychology of Organizations and  Inequality, 
57 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Q. 190 (1994). 
176 See Schultz, supra note 144 (discussing and documenting the presence of harassment policies and 
no- tolerance enforcement).
177 See ANTILLA, supra note 23, at 116-17.
178
   In a case in which the plaintiff was awarded $1.5 million in punitive damanges under the arbitration 
procedure instituted by the Smith Barney settlement, the arbitration panel chastised the company for its 
“failure to undertake any meaningful investigations.”  See Randall Smith, Salomon is Told to Pay Broker 
$3.2 Million, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2002, at C1.   In the Eveleth Mines case, one of the plaintiffs who went 
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case, the company may have been trying to protect a powerful, and profitable, male 
manager but, even in that case, the strategy ultimately failed as once the lawsuit was 
filed, the manager at the center of the controversy quietly left  the firm.179
The grocery store cases, which began nearly thirty years ago, provide another 
perplexing example of corporate indifference to gender inequality within the firm.  The 
lack of women in management positions – as well as the lack of women in positions that 
might lead to management – was plainly visible to anyone who bothered to look, as 
evidenced by the plaintiffs’ practice of collecting data by viewing photographs of 
managers hanging in stores.180  Home Depot and Wal-Mart certainly must have known of 
their assignment patterns, and a walk through virtually any of their stores would have 
confirmed that women were working primarily at cash registers rather than on the sales 
floors or in management positions.181 The harassment uncovered by the EEOC in the 
Mitsubishi case was so pervasive that it could not have gone unnoticed by management 
level officials, and the same appears to be true for the other cases involving patterns of 
sexual harassment.
As noted, some of the managements’ tolerance for the behavior may reflect an 
implicit calculus of the value of the female employees when compared to the male 
employees.   One notable example involved the difficulty of Pamela Martens finding new 
employment after she was fired by Smith Barney.  Ms. Martens had a substantial 
to complain to the superintendent noticed a picture of a vagina above his desk with the words, “Miners do it 
better in the bush.”  See Jon Tevlin, The Eveleth Mines Case, STAR TRIBUNE, Nov. 29, 1998, at A8.
179 See Spiro, supra note 25, at 102  (noting that the manager was placed on leave and retired shortly 
thereafter.)  
180
  In the Lucky’s case, the court found that the company was aware of the underrepresentation of 
women in management positions since at least 1986.  See Stender, 803 F. Supp. at 331. 
181
  Since I have begun this research, I have kept my own tallies when I visit stores such as Home Depot, 
where my cursory investigations suggest that not much has changed in the assignment patterns in the stores.  
The same is true in banks, where one is far more likely to find women as bank tellers rather than bank 
managers. 
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portfolio of business but firms were reluctant to hire her presumably because they viewed 
her as a trouble maker who might alienate male employees.182  Beyond this kind of rough 
calculus, another reason the firms tolerated such exclusionary practices, has to do with 
the stereotypes that undergird the very practices at issue.  This is particularly true in these 
industries that are perpetuating past practices given that those practices will be seen as the 
norm, and because they are the norm, they will also be assumed to be efficient, given that 
efficiency is the underlying mantra of business practices.  Without undertaking an effort 
to determine whether the practices are efficient, firms will persist with the practices they 
have always used.  Management’s stereotypes about women, however, will often 
preclude taking the step necessary to evaluate their practices.  If the managers begin with 
the assumption that women are not “tough enough” to be brokers, will not be willing to 
move to take advantage of promotional opportunities, or if they assume that women want 
to work part-time and are likely to leave the workplace for extended periods to have and 
care for children, then there will be no reason to examine the existing practices, at least 
without some shocking event, or without perhaps a sense that they are falling behind 
competitors because of their practices.183  This will be particularly true when there is 
some behavior that is congruent with management expectations.  The social psychology 
literature explains that one of the reasons stereotypes are so resistant to change is the 
human tendency to emphasize stereotype consistent behavior while discounting behavior 
182
  Ms. Martens was turned down for employment by Paine Webber, Merrill Lynch and Dean Witter, 
and was ultimately hired by A.G. Edwards.  See ANTILLA, supra note 23, at 133-35. 
183
  In his recent book on the persistence of racial discrimination, Glenn Loury describes a similar 
process among individuals who fail to notice the need for change because their world view comports with 
an “inchoate sense of the natural order of things.”  GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL 
INEQUALITY 41 (2001). 
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that is inconsistent with our gender schemas.184  This is no less true of senior 
management than it is of employees or mid-level managers.  
The patterns of exclusion are even more difficult to change given that they are 
reinforced by the social ambivalence regarding the role of women in the labor market that 
was described above.185  Although this ambivalence often lurks below the surface, the 
social signals are not hard to detect, and those signals likely impose a constraint on 
change, creating what Alice Kessler-Harris refers to as the “tenacity of the gendered 
imagination.”186
IV.  CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
There remains a serious undercurrent of hostility to women in the workplace that
is reflected in the class action cases that have arisen over the last decade and which 
involve overt acts of hostility towards women with an intent to preserve the male norms 
that have persisted despite our national pledges of gender equality.  The persistence of 
these cases also help explain why we have not made more progress towards integrating 
the workplace, and why the labor market remains so deeply segregated by sex.  This is 
not to suggest that all of the gender inequities we observe result from intentional acts of 
discrimination – it is important to note that no one theory of discrimination, no one theory 
of the workplace, can adequately explain what we observe.  Rather than a single theory, 
we should look to many different theories and explanations to help us piece together the 
184 See generally Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination, in 2 THE HANDBOOK ON 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 340 (Danil T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998); see also Linda A. Jackson, et al., The 
Effects of Stereotype Consistency and Consensus Information on Predictions of Performance, 133 J. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 293 (1993); John M. Darley & Russell H. Fazio, Expectency Confirmation Processes Arising in 
the Social Interaction Sequence, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 867 (1986).  
185 See text accompanying notes 155-58, supra.
186 See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 130, at 291.
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puzzle that gender inequality in the workplace remains.187  Intentional discrimination 
remains a critical piece of the puzzle.
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that womens’ experience in the 
workplace has not changed as much as is often stated or hoped.  Moreover, this is not 
simply a result of institutional factors, of difficulties women may have in balancing their 
various commitments, or of their preferences, but the inequality is deeply grounded in 
gender stereotypes and assumptions about women’s interests – gender stereotypes and 
assumptions that reflect views that we typically associate with a different era.  One 
problem with the subtle discrimination literature is its tendency to remove the blame for 
persistent inequalities from the actors who are responsible for the actions that produce 
those inequalities, shifting the blame instead to amorphous institutions or the purported 
benign actions of well-intentioned individuals.  Most of the behavior described in this 
article can only be seen as subtle if that term is used to encompass any behavior that is 
not accompanied by overt statements of hostility to women, but that would be a curious 
definition of subtle discrimination, particularly in the twenty-first century when such 
statements are thankfully quite rare – though as these cases indicate, certainly not non-
existent.  Although subtle forces play a strong role in perpetuating gender inequities,188
intentional discrimination likewise plays an important role, and one that is too often 
ignored.
187
  In a related sense, Kathryn Abrams writes, “[F]eminists should argue that one size cannot fit all, 
theoretically speaking; it is crucial to see women’s inequality as the product of many intersecting motives, 
constructions, and modes of treatment.”  Abrams, supra note 141, at 1217.  
188
   For two helpful discussions of the ways subtle forces can lead to various inequities see VALIAN, 
supra note 9 and Sturm, supra note 9.  Valian in particular emphasizes the way in which women are 
affected by what she defines as “cumulative disadvantage,” the cumulative effect of stereotypes, slights and 
assumptions. 
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This is the point at which I would traditionally be expected to offer policy 
prescriptions for eradicating the effects of discrimination from the workplace, perhaps by 
calling for greater enforcement of the law, or a change in the law, enhancing penalties, or 
more diversity training.  But that is not the purpose of this paper.  Instead, I have here 
sought to marshal evidence from existing cases as a way of demonstrating the persistence 
of intentional discrimination against women in the workplace at a level that far exceeds 
common perceptions.  This level of discrimination is largely invisible because it is so 
common, and because it raises fundamental questions regarding our societal commitment 
to gender equality – a commitment that has always been more powerful rhetorically than 
in its implementation.
There is another reason for withholding policy prescriptions, which is that I am 
not at all certain that there is an easy fix or that some of the common policy suggestions
would aid the quest for gender integration and equality.  As I have noted elsewhere, I 
believe that the turn to caretaking represents a step backward rather than a step forward in 
the quest for greater gender equality becauseit enshrines caretaking as women’s work, 
and in many instances also privileges care work over labor market work.  I also do not 
think education or diversity training will likely move us forward, particularly since so 
much of both is litigation driven and as a result tends to offer businesses public relations 
more than its offers employees meaningful education.189  This is not to suggest that 
training makes no difference – it is certainly the case that there are many employment 
practices committed employers can institute to decrease workplace barriers for women.  
189
   There is little question that diversity training has become the cure of the day but there is a 
substantial question whether any of that training is beneficial.  For a thorough review of the literature, and 
one that concludes that there is little documented support for the benefits of diversity training see Susan 
Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the 
Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L.  1 (2001).
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The comprehensive study and follow-up conducted by Johns Hopkins University when it 
discovered that female professors were consistently falling behind their male peers is one 
example of a successful course for change.190 As the demographics of the workplace 
continue to evolve, more employers are likely to enact policies intended to retain and 
attract female employees.  But the models of change remain the exception rather than the 
rule – a rule that seems far more represented in the class action cases discussed earlier.
More than anything else, these cases serve as a reminder us of just how much remains to 
be done, how far we remain from our commitment to achieving our goal of gender 
equality in the workplace.  
190 See VALIAN, supra note 9, at 319-22.  
